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 They ask us if we blame the parents? Who else do we blame? I taught my son right from wrong.
My son wasn't shooting people up. My son was in the library doing what he was supposed to do. n1
 [*2]  I'm sorry. Like Shakespeare says, "Good wombs hath borne bad sons." n2 [*3]
Introduction: The Crime of Poor Parenting
 A movement is afoot to hold parents criminally responsible for the delinquent acts of their children.
This effort is part of a larger movement inducing parents to undertake greater responsibility for their
wayward children and threatening increased legal sanctions if they fail. In addition to the criminal
parental responsibility laws analyzed in this Article, parents face greater statutory civil penalties for
property damage caused by their children, eviction from public housing if criminal activity has
occurred in their homes, and increased exposure to civil lawsuits filed by victims of youth violence.
Within this larger campaign, the criminal parental responsibility laws effectively convert the status
of parenting a juvenile delinquent into a public welfare offense.
These related developments broadening the law's regulation of parenting are responses to, and
best seen in the context of, the current criminalization of juvenile delinquency. n3 A decade ago,
states began enacting pervasive measures to remove violent children from their parents and from the
protection of the juvenile court in reaction to the then growing crime rate. Propelled further by the
publicity surrounding numerous tragic shootings committed by youths, states have augmented their
provisions transferring jurisdiction over youth violence from juvenile to criminal court in an
expanding range of cases. Statistically, these precipitating incidents have by now been subsumed
within the overall reduction in the national crime rate, both juvenile and adult. However, the
popular reaction to the brief peak of juvenile violence continues to drive punitive legislation aimed
at treating violent children as adults. To this end, transfer provisions resolve the conflict between
the desire to protect dependent children and the aim of punishing violent children by treating the
latter as adults and not as children.
The removal of this population from juvenile court protection and treatment is grounded on the
premise that the predatory nature of certain youth crime demonstrates the workings of a mature
mind impervious to rehabilitation. The current juvenile justice "counter-reformation" n4 seeks to
substitute retribution and  [*4]  deterrence for what it considers the discredited dream of the juvenile
court. As a result, the legal system increasingly treats both violent and non-violent youths as adults.
However, extending the net of parental responsibility over juvenile delinquency through parental
responsibility laws paradoxically pivots on the opposite rationale: the very immaturity of youthful
deviants justifies society in holding parents criminally responsible for failing to properly supervise
their children. The legislative and popular currents so outlined flow in different directions. On the
one hand, they conceive of adolescents as, on the one hand, mature actors possessed of an efficient
free will and, on the other, as malleable dependents subject to parental control.
But adolescents are neither autonomous nor automatons. They may best be described as
"semiautonomous" juveniles approaching adulthood. They have not fully achieved the emotional
maturity of adulthood, nor are their actions totally within parental control. Further, both the
treatment of juveniles as "automatic adults" and the criminalization of parental supervision rely on
the criminal law to perform tasks for which it is ill-suited. Indeed, an examination of the effects
both trends are having upon society suggests failure. First, with respect to the criminalization of
juvenile delinquency, studies involving matched sets of juveniles consistently show that transfer
into the adult criminal system has proven counterproductive, as measured by the increased
recidivism rate, the severity of the subsequent offense, and the lessening of the time between release
and rearrest. n5 Moreover, these "automatic adults" are ineligible for the more age-appropriate
social services offered through juvenile probation. Second, in considering parents who find
themselves in criminal court defending against charges of inadequate parenting, the traditional
sanctions of the criminal law have failed to address the problems faced by these parents, their
children, or the victims of their children's delinquencies. In the movements discussed in this Article,
the philosophy, legal tools, and methodologies of the criminal court have replaced their family law
and juvenile court counterparts. From a practical point of view, the  [*5]  resulting system is
unworkable: the court enforcing the parental responsibility law lacks jurisdiction over the child,
while the court adjudicating juvenile delinquency has no viable method to involve the parents.
Commentators have generally either praised or decried the ascription of criminal responsibility
to poor parenting, and have focused on the constitutional and policy implications of this expansion
of the criminal law. n6 This Article seeks to further the analysis of this trend in two ways. First, it
examines the laws treating juvenile delinquents as if they were adults in light of the legal provisions
exposing parents to criminal liability for their failure to properly supervise those same child
offenders. Second, it proposes two alternative resolutions to the tension between rendering parents
immune from consequences of and concern for their children's delinquent acts, and subjecting the
parents to unwarranted criminal liability. The first proposal recognizes the success of the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement and suggests that parents be involved in the family group
conference approach, thereby empowering both the victim and the community to resolve the
damage caused by the delinquent act. The second proposal suggests that parents be made parties to
juvenile delinquency dispositions involving their children, so that the courts can, through
appropriate orders, monitor the parents' efforts in furthering the reformation of their child.
In Part I, this Article analyzes the "criminalization" n7 of juvenile delinquency. The juvenile
justice counter-reformation has made substantial headway in reversing the idea of special
protections for children who are accused of committing serious crimes. But the debate over how to
deal with violent youth has been drastically reshaped over the past century. Earlier reforms
minimized punishment and emphasized therapeutic intervention in the children's lives. n8 The
current retributive juvenile justice movement, by contrast, features assertions about a dramatic
increase in the present rate and malevolence of juvenile crime, n9 demographic estimates that
predict a coming flood of "super-  [*6]  predators," n10 and the thesis that violent youthful acts
demonstrate both the maturity of the perpetrators and their defiance of the rehabilitative processes
of the juvenile court. n11 However, all three of these foundational propositions are demonstrably
false. n12 This demonstration in Part I is critical to the next step of the analysis presented in this
Article. Because the "super-predator" crisis is largely a myth, the criminal parental responsibility
laws are unnecessary, and the alternative methods proposed in this Article to increase parental
involvement in their children's delinquency cases can appropriately address the problem.
Part II analyzes the parental responsibility laws, which have become popular legal weapons
deployed in an effort to force parents to control their children's anti-social behavior. These laws
hold parents criminally responsible when their children commit delinquent acts. Their premise is the
empirically unsubstantiated assumption that juvenile delinquency results primarily from improper
parental supervision. These laws ignore the behavioral and developmental evidence that suggests a
far more complex interrelationship between parents, their teenagers, and their deviance. Moreover,
the laws frequently depend on strict liability in order to criminalize the unproven parental failure to
properly supervise a wayward child. The statutory framework often determines that the child's
commission of one or more delinquent acts entirely serves - even in the absence of any formal
adjudication of juvenile delinquency - to prove their parents' neglect of the duty of proper
supervision, thereby providing a sufficient predicate for the imposition of criminal sanctions.
Punishing parents on the generalized and unproven assumption that they bear actual,  [*7]  causal
responsibility for juvenile delinquency results in an unconstitutional violation of the parents' due
process rights and effectively converts poor, or simply unlucky, parenting into a public welfare
offense.
Part III proposes a reasoned approach to legal intervention in the relationship between parental
supervision and juvenile crime, one that addresses the needs of community safety as well as the
future course of the delinquent juvenile. Two possible avenues are evaluated. One direction
suggests jettisoning a parental culpability analysis in toto. This first approach fully respects parents'
prerogatives with regard to the raising of children. It suggests that the issue of parental involvement
in juvenile court may best be addressed within the perspective of the emerging movement in
therapeutic jurisprudence, including voluntary family group conferences, mediation, teen courts,
and other forms of alternative dispute resolution emphasizing restorative justice. The second, and
quite different option, assumes that policymakers will continue to insist on some version of
culpability analysis for parental responsibility in juvenile delinquency cases. If so, this Article
proposes that the law turn away from the inappropriate imposition of criminal jurisdiction over
parents as conferred by the parental responsibility laws, and instead invest the juvenile court with
the power to assert jurisdiction over parents in the dispositional phase of delinquency proceedings.
The delinquency jurisdiction of family courts can more effectively serve to accommodate the
legitimate concerns of the parental responsibility laws. n13
While these two suggested avenues of reform are quite distinct, they share a conception of
juvenile and family courts as principally civil courts concerned with ensuring the welfare of
families and their communities, rather than as primarily criminal courts oriented to administering a
penal code for children. The suggested reforms do not promise rapid success in restoring disrupted
families and curbing juvenile delinquency. They make a start, however, at assaying a more
principled effort both to respond to the actual level of maturation exhibited by our children as they
struggle through adolescence, and to respect the need to  [*8]  hold both juveniles and their parents
appropriately accountable for their actions.
I
 Maturation-by-Crime: Punishing Juveniles as if They Were Adults
 The legal system's treatment of crimes committed by children has come under enormous criticism
in recent years. n14 A score of recent and nationally-publicized incidents involving school children
- one as young as six years old - killing classmates and teachers has galvanized public criticism of
the way American society handles juvenile delinquency. n15 The legislative and media  [*9]
reaction to these violent incidents has intensified the perception that juvenile lawbreaking has
dramatically increased. n16 However, the vast majority of youthful crime is nonviolent, n17 and
school shootings are themselves atypical of youth violence. n18 In fact, both juvenile and adult
crime rates have strikingly declined in recent years. n19
American society is in the midst of a sea change in its perception of juvenile delinquents and
their parents. The most arresting recent development is the law's reconceptualization of child
offenders as violent predators warranting retribution rather than as our wayward sons and daughters
in need of a guiding hand. Throughout most of the twentieth century, juvenile delinquents were
perceived as "vulnerable and in need of protection and redirection rather than of punishment." n20
At least until the Supreme Court's imposition of more formal juvenile court procedures in Kent v.
United States, n21 In re Gault, n22 and In re  [*10]  Winship, n23 the juvenile court's role was
accepted as paternalistic rather than legalistic. n24 The children subject to its delinquency
jurisdiction were likewise envisioned as "childlike, psychologically troubled, and malleable." n25
But now, at the turn of the millennium, youthful malefactors, especially those charged with serious
offenses, are "widely viewed as essentially incorrigible." n26 Impressions of troubled youth have
decidedly altered: the image "is not ... Dennis the Menace. It's Billy the Kid." n27 Thus, a  [*11]
century of legal wisdom and a juvenile justice system that was designed to "protect children from
the harsh punishments of the adult criminal system" n28 has been substantially reconsidered. n29 A
profusion of laws has been enacted to arm communities in their fight against juvenile criminality, a
development that has transformed the focus of juvenile courts from a baseline examination of the
best interests of the child to an overarching concern with public safety, child punishment, and
individualized accountability. n30
One measure of this concern is the sharp diminution in the  [*12]  support for the belief that
juvenile offenders deserve their own legal bailiwick; i.e., a venue where treatment is encouraged
over punishment. n31 The title of the 1998 annual report of the Coalition for Juvenile Justice
questions whether the juvenile court's one hundredth anniversary should be marked as "a
celebration or a wake." n32 The sense that juvenile courts are not up to the task of punishing
children who commit adult-sized crimes leads  [*13]  to the view that minors who commit serious
felonies have emancipated themselves from the realm of juvenile justice. This view is exemplified
by the words of a judge upon sentencing a 15-year old boy to life in prison for murder: "I do not
perceive you to be a child ... your monstrous act made you an adult." n33 The theory that juveniles
emancipate themselves by committing serious crimes is inconsistent with established legal
procedures to which minors may resort in seeking to emancipate themselves. n34
A. The Invention of the Super-Predator
1. A Rhetorical Construct
 Only recently have violent juveniles been viewed as predatory. To be sure, the legal system has
long struggled with the appropriate response to violent acts committed by juveniles, and in an
important sense we are witnessing only the latest phase of the debate. n35 However, some
generalizations may be fairly made. Prior to the latter third of the twentieth century, deviant
children were predominantly viewed as appropriate subjects for rehabilitation by virtue of their
dependent status within their families and society. The juvenile court was viewed as the capable
agent of that reformation at the "nexus where psychology and philanthropy were to combine and
place a rational and loving hand on wayward youth." n36 In a 1963 review of "contributing to
delinquency"  [*14]  statutes, the author postulated the pre-Gault norms: "Few persons would be
truculent enough to quarrel with the basic aims of the juvenile court movement, or to take issue with
the ideal of regenerating wayward youths without subjecting them to the often rigid, punitive, and
distressing vagaries of adult criminal procedure." n37 Indeed, juvenile justice reform could, until
recently, be fairly characterized as a "turn from punitive justice to an avowedly therapeutic style of
social control." n38
The procedural reforms mandated by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s were propelled
by a strong skepticism about the efficacy of the juvenile court's ability to provide procedural
fairness or to foster substantive rehabilitation. n39 In turn, these holdings presaged a rapid re-
examination of the influences on, and appropriate legal response to, offending youth. The more
retributive jurisprudential turn of the 1970s and 1980s resulted from the emerging belief among
reformers that juveniles were possessed of adequate moral reasoning and self-control to warrant
holding them responsible for their actions, albeit at a lower level than adults. n40 Greater reliance
on determinate sentencing  [*15]  schemes for juveniles demonstrated this accommodation to
retributive and deterrent concerns. These reforms strained, but still sustained, a core belief that
developmental immaturity should be factored into the determination of the appropriate sanction, and
that the rehabilitative potential of every child should be socially shielded and nurtured. n41
Today, violent children are no longer viewed as salvageable n42 and the current slew of juvenile
justice measures emphasizing retribution and emancipation-by-crime form the core of the counter-
reformation. Contemporary jurisprudence emphasizes a punitive style of social control, and has
transformed the juvenile offender from a rehabilitative subject to a retributive object. Concern for
preserving the special legal status of childhood is ebbing. Calls to abolish the juvenile court provide
one measure of this phenomenon. n43 Another sign of the noticeable shift in the wind is an infusion
of the concept of juvenile accountability into the purpose clauses of many states' juvenile codes. For
instance, Kansas recently amended its juvenile offenders code to emphasize its "primary goal ... to
promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for such juvenile's behavior and improve
the ability of juveniles to live more productively and responsibly in the community." n44 Similarly,
changes to the Wisconsin juvenile justice code aim to create a "system which will protect the
community, impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with
competencies to live responsibly and productively." n45
 [*16]  Between 1992 and 1997, forty-seven states and the District of  [*17]  Columbia enacted
punitive juvenile justice legislation. n46 These provisions included laws making it easier to transfer
children from the juvenile to the criminal court (forty-five states); laws enlarging the sentencing
options for juvenile or criminal courts in cases dealing with youth (thirty-one states); and laws
lessening or abrogating the obligation of confidentiality that traditionally inhered in juvenile
proceedings (forty-seven states). n47 Additionally, the discrepancy between the level of sanctions
imposed on adult and child offenders has greatly diminished in cases involving violence. n48
Contemporary discourse about juvenile justice has largely replaced the image of the delinquent
with that of the super-predator, and this shift carries significant legal consequences. Rhetoric about
a social phenomenon simultaneously reflects and influences legal reality, as discourse is "the central
art by which community and culture are established, maintained, and transformed." n49 The term
"juvenile delinquent" is redolent of the antiquated rhetoric of the founders of the juvenile court,
those judges and other reformers who assumed the role of benevolent parent and wise social worker
rolled into one. These leaders sought to persuade young miscreants to acknowledge their folly and
choose the path of betterment. n50 By contrast, today's dehumanizing  [*18]  discourse reflects
altered ideological assumptions about youthful deviance. But the rhetorical broadsides also further
the transformations in the cultural dynamic within which society situates adolescent violence. n51
Legislation attuned to the new zeitgeist frequently follows.
Since the juvenile reforms which heralded the twentieth century devised rhetorical constructs to
emphasize the divorce of juveniles from the adult system, it is not surprising that the counter-
reformation a century later should seek to reverse that discursive project. From the beginning of a
separate juvenile jurisprudence, the expressive legal canvas provided a field apart for children in
trouble: "Prosecutor became prosecuting attorney, the defendant child a ward of the state, a
judgment of guilt not a conviction but adjudication of status, and the offender not a criminal, but a
juvenile delinquent." n52 Recent Connecticut legislation,  [*19]  however, typifies the modern trend
in no longer referring to juveniles as "adjudicated" delinquents, but rather as "convicted." n53
Rhetorical conversion logically follows from this conceptual modulation. Those who spearheaded
the juvenile court movement conceived of delinquency as an illness and determined the causes of
crime to stem from squalid human and material environments. n54 They believed that delinquency
could, and should, be treated rather than condemned. By contrast, the counter-reformation's call for
personal accountability suggests that the state is no longer interested in treating recalcitrant youth,
but rather in ensuring that juveniles bear the brunt of both the penal and rhetorical consequences of
"conviction." n55
2. The Reality of Juvenile Crime Rates
 The current dark vision of child deviants derives, in large part, from the perceived lethal nature
associated with contemporary juvenile delinquency, n56 as well as from misinterpretations of the
[*20]  trends in juvenile arrest and crime victimization data. n57 Teenagers charged with homicide
present the worst nightmare scenario for the juvenile justice system. n58 Indeed, the ostensible
impotence of the juvenile court is linked to its failure to "deal with a new breed of aggressive young
offenders." n59
The actual demographics of youth crime in the past two decades do not, however, conform to
this dogma of ever-spiraling violent criminality. Rather, the data inscribe a more complex image. To
be sure, the overall increase in violent juvenile crime between the late-1980s and the mid-1990s was
substantial. After a period of relative stability from the early 1970s through 1988, the juvenile
violent crime arrest rate jumped in 1989 to the highest level since the 1960s (the earliest period for
which comparable nationwide data is available). n60 This arrest rate then surged upward, climbing
62% in the years between 1988 and 1994. n61 The call for tougher measures to combat juvenile
crime initially appears reasonable in light of this apparent statistical escalation.
However, National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data tell a considerably different story.
As with the arrest statistics, the rate of victimization increased in the 1990s, although not by as great
a proportion as the arrest data. n62 By 1995, however, the victimization measure had leveled to its
traditional level. n63 After reviewing the NCVS figures, the 1999 National Report by the
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (the OJJDP Report)
concluded that "the rate of serious offending as of the mid-1990s was comparable to that of a
generation ago." n64 Moreover, the decline in arrest rates -  [*21]  the traditional criminological
measure - after the early 1990s has been markedly steep. The rate of serious violent crimes, such as
rape, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault, committed by juveniles dropped by one-third
between 1993 and 1997, ultimately returning to levels comparable to the relatively stable juvenile
crime rate between 1973 and 1989. n65
The data also reveal significant variation in the types of crimes at issue. Juvenile arrest rates for
rape and robbery between 1980 and 1996 display no distinctive trend, alternately rising and falling
throughout the period. n66 Aggravated assault arrest rates in 1996 were 50% higher than in 1980,
but much of that increase may be attributed to improvements in communications technology and
developing police reporting methodologies, which skew comparisons between earlier and later
reporting patterns. n67 Additionally, the broad expanse of behavior which may be characterized as
aggravated assault suggests the lack of specificity of police reporting standards within that crime
category. n68 Murder statistics experienced an unquestionably significant rise. During the period
from 1987 to 1994, the total number of annual murders by juveniles doubled. n69 This increase,
however, appears to have been entirely firearm-related. n70 The very nature of gun  [*22]  violence,
which is inherently lethal, suggests that the relatively larger number of deaths was due to a
proportionally smaller number of episodes. Indeed, a very small cohort of youthful killers was
responsible for the substantial increase in the murder rate. n71 Even within the murder category,
however, the 1987-1993 increase in juvenile crime had almost reversed and returned to its former
level by 1997. n72 Finally, most juveniles who are arrested face charges involving offenses and less
serious infractions, not violent crimes. n73 In addition, juvenile property crime rates remained fairly
stable, even showing a slight decrease, between 1980 and 1997. n74
Recently plummeting juvenile crime rates comprise a subset of the steep decline in the total
crime rate. Violence by adults diminished by 25% between 1993 and 1997. n75 National crime rates
in 1998 reflected a decline, sometimes conspicuously so, from rates in 1973. Overall rates of
robbery and aggravated assault were equivalent in 1992 and 1973, homicide arrest rates in 1993
matched those of 1973, and burglary rates showed a deep decline through the 1980s. n76 In fact, the
pace of declining crime rates is quickening. After 3% annual decreases in 1996 and 1997, the  [*23]
modified annual crime index total, which includes both violent and property crimes, decreased 6%
in 1998 and 7% in 1999. n77 Table 1 reflects this quarter-century rise and fall in violent crime. The
parabola of overall violent crime, and also of its rape, robbery, and aggravated assault components,
has arched dramatically below 1973 levels. Recently released findings confirm the sharp downward
direction of crime rates. From 1998 to 1999, the overall violent crime rate decreased 10%, and the
property crime rate declined 9%. n78 Significantly, both the rise and fall of juvenile crime have
paralleled the trajectory of adult crime. n79 Thus, within the overall national crime rate, juveniles
did not stand out as a particularly predatory cohort.
Table 1
 Number of victimizations per 1,000 population age 12 and over, 1973-1998*
[SEE TABLE IN ORIGINAL]
 Misinterpretations of this demographic data resulted in predictions of the emergence of a hitherto
undiscovered, malignant breed of juvenile malefactor. In 1996, for instance, U.S. Representative
William McCollum testified, in front of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Early
Childhood, Youth and Families, that America should "put these demographic facts together and
brace [itself] for the coming generation of 'super-predators.'" n80 Prominent culture critic William J.
Bennett predicted that, because the statistical cohort of adolescents was going to significantly
increase during the decade, "the violent upsurge will probably accelerate." n81 In a 1995 study
(updated in 1997), criminologist James A. Fox concluded "that the growth in juvenile population in
the next decade will cause a dramatic increase in the level of juvenile violence." n82 Studies have
suggested  [*24]  that mass media reporting techniques and other factors influence the public
perception about crime more than the actual level of victimization. n83 The "body count school of
crime journalism" encourages a sense of "vicarious victimization" n84 that prefers fear to facts. n85
Doomsday headlines in cases involving teenagers abounded in the last years of the 1990s. n86
The generation of adolescent super-predators was not discovered, it was invented. Since youth
and adult criminalization rates run on roughly parallel tracks, it is hard to justify selecting the
juvenile category as presenting a new genus of violent criminal. In fact, the age cohort consisting of
persons between the ages of thirty and fifty exhibited the greatest increase in rates of aggravated
assault in the early 1990s, n87 yet "no one has argued that there is a new breed of middle-aged
superpredator." n88 Contrary  [*25]  to popular impressions, neither the rates for adult nor juvenile
arrests qualifies either group for the obloquy of the super-predator label. n89
Youth violence arrest rates normally do not rise or fall for prolonged periods of time. Rather,
trends frequently reverse, and then reverse again. n90 Arrest rates often notably shift after short
bursts in one direction or the other, so that prognostications based on short-term patterns are not
reliable. Nor are rates of youth offenses statistically connected to the rates of change in the youth
population. n91 From 1987 to 1994, arrests for violent crime by juveniles skyrocketed while their
population grew only marginally. n92 From 1994 through 1997, the juvenile population continued
its slow increase, but arrests nose-dived. n93 Cultural changes and policy decisions have a greater
impact on juvenile crime rates than population trends. As the OJJDP Report concluded,
"demography is not destiny." n94 In fact, the core of recent punitive legislation has been driven by
the myth of a generation of adolescent super-predators. n95
 [*26]   [*27]
B.
"That Malice Which is to Supply Age" n96
1. Transfer to Adult Court: Developmental Bases
 Waiver policies also posit a developmental basis for the treatment of a child as an adult. This aspect
of the juvenile counter-reformation insists that children's maturity, as evidenced by their criminal
behavior, makes it appropriate to hold them responsible for criminal acts on the same basis as
adults. A separate dispositional scheme would thus be unnecessary. However, the theory that
children demonstrate maturation and autonomy by the commission of criminal acts has tenuous
roots in the common law. The infancy doctrine, also know as the doli incapax principle, n97
traditionally provided that children under seven were absolutely immune from prosecution. n98Note
that the infancy defense is not generally available in juvenile court. n99 Such young children were
assumed to lack the mental capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct and to develop
the mental state required to commit a crime. n100 Thus, these children could not be legally
responsible for their actions. n101 At the other end of traditional childhood, those who had reached
the age of fourteen were presumed  [*28]  to be capable of criminal responsibility and, thus, were
treated as adults. n102
Children between the ages of seven and fourteen benefitted from a tempered version of the
infancy defense. Youth in these in-between ages were not considered accountable for their
misdeeds, because they were presumed to lack the mental capacity to understand "the likely
physical consequences of [their] act or its wrongful ... nature." n103 However, this presumption was
rebuttable. n104 In order to proceed criminally in such a case, the prosecutor bore the burden of
proving that the particular child was indeed mentally capable and thus could legally be charged with
the criminal act. n105 Relevant factors included evidence of the youth's plan and method of
execution, as well as prior similar conduct. n106 The fact that the youth tried to hide the crime,
either physically or by lying, was also pertinent to the question of legal responsibility. n107 The
inquiry might also extend into the child's environment, intelligence, education, and moral
underpinnings. n108  [*29]  Blackstone highlighted the juvenile's moral and intellectual
development as the fulcrum of the culpability assessment: "The capacity of doing ill, or contracting
guilt, is not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's
understanding and judgment." n109 It is in this limited context of establishing the lower age
boundary for criminal liability that Blackstone made his famous remark that, while children as
young as ten had been found doli capax, "in all such cases, the evidence of that malice which is to
supply age, ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction." n110
The juvenile counter-reformation appears to have purloined a misapprehended version of
Blackstone's dictum as its mandate. The movement maintains that malicious behavior may "supply
age" in the context of assessing the appropriateness of replacing a treatment-oriented program with
a retributive sanction. But this rendering confuses malevolence with maturity. Children are
developmentally different from their elders, as research finds and public opinion concurs, and that
difference suggests the need for a different yardstick with which to measure juvenile and adult
transgressions. n111 Youthful decision-making is qualitatively different than adult judgment, and
warrants a more solicitous approach. n112 Adolescent development includes progress through
arenas of cognitive capacity (knowing right from wrong) as well as volitional control
(demonstrating mastery over self). Further, children and adults diverge in terms of moral formation
n113 and  [*30]  ego development. n114 Youthful decision-making competencies have been
evaluated for "psychosocial maturity," "judgment," and "temperance," and in each case behavioral
science has found children less developed than adults. n115 Finally, the tendency to take risks
denotes one of the principal dissimilarities between youths and adults. Divergences between the
adult's and the child's life experience and temporal outlook affect the number and level of hazards
undertaken. Unrealistic optimism in balancing the likelihood of success versus the prospects for
failure characterizes adolescence, n116 because juveniles generally have difficulty meshing a
speculative future outcome into their strong presentist outlook. n117 While these research findings
do not comprise a paean to impulsiveness, they do indicate the normality of impetuous, sensation-
seeking acts attributable to hormonal or psychological changes. n118 Risk-taking helps to shape
teenage identity; in fact, frequent risk-taking is a "normative, healthy, developmental  [*31]
behavior for adolescents." n119
As children age, they move from dependency toward autonomy. Most teenagers are best
described as semiautonomous. n120 Far from having achieved maturity, their moral characters are
unfinished, and many remain particularly vulnerable to peer and other external influences. n121
"Most adolescent decisions to break the law or not take place on a social stage where the immediate
pressure of peers urging the adolescent on is often the real motive for most teenage crime." n122
Resisting peer pressure is a social faculty essential to adherence to legal norms, yet many teenagers
have not yet matured to the point of having developed that resistence.
Because adolescents are not fully autonomous moral agents, it would be unjust to hold them
responsible as if they were. Nor, of course, should their unfolding development render them
immune from the consequences of their actions. But the dichotomous distinctions enforced by the
waiver statutes divide youth into two mutually exclusive camps: candidates for rehabilitation and
targets for retribution. This artificial bifurcation disregards the developmental continuum in which
most adolescents live before maturing into law-abiding adults. Automatic waiver policies are also
logically unsatisfactory, because they propose a procedural answer to a substantive question. To the
quandary of how to deal with seriously problematic youth, they respond with the pretense that such
adolescents are adult equivalents. This answer fails to satisfy either the just desserts goals of the
juvenile counter-reformation, or the need for a reasoned approach to the issue of families with
troubled youth.
 [*32]
2. Transfer to Adult Court: Practical Consequences
 The transfer of arrested youth into adult criminal courts represents an effort to reconfigure the
juvenile justice system primarily along behavioral lines rather than by relying on age criteria.
Shifting jurisdiction over the offender from juvenile to criminal court purports to resolve the
conflict between the goals of protecting dependent children and punishing violent children by
declaring the latter to be adults. Youth charged with certain offenses are thus categorically deemed
beyond the rehabilitative promise of juvenile court. Transfer to the criminal justice system
symbolizes a metamorphosis from "redeemable youth" n123 into "unsalvageable adult." n124
Pervasive fear of adolescent criminals has led to the concomitant popular view that juvenile courts
effectively serve to funnel rather than to filter youth crime. Some critics have questioned the core of
the juvenile court philosophy, the basic belief in "the difference between youth and adults." n125
Together, these precepts have fueled calls for reconsideration and even elimination of juvenile court
jurisdiction. n126
Society faces a deep quandary in dealing with seriously problematic youth. One popular
resolution declares that the commission of a seriously violent act signals the developmental
transition of the offender from adolescence to adulthood. n127 But in what sense can this be true?
There is no social science research to support the premise that anti-social behavior evidences the
successful navigation of the passage into adult maturity. To the contrary, the violation of social
norms by young people has always been regarded - as the Supreme Court observed in 1979 - as
proof of the want of maturity, "grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." n128 Although the notion that a
child matures into  [*33]  adulthood through the commission of a heinous crime is psychologically
invalid, other possible interpretations of the individual developmental process may not be dismissed
so easily.
The argument has been made that the justice system labels children as adults and transfers them
to criminal court, not because the juveniles have reached a level of development equal to adulthood,
but rather because society considers them disposable. n129 A less polemical look at the issue,
however, suggests other rationales, ones more sympathetic to the frustrating tension inherent in
dealing with children whose vicious acts put the juvenile court philosophy to its gravest test. Indeed,
it is the very severity of the violence, not any aspect of a supposedly mature mind, which appears to
compromise the original child-saving thesis of the juvenile court. n130 The modern counter-
reformers do not ascribe sophisticated or intricate characteristics to super-predators. n131 Rather,
they react in a retributive manner to the occurrence of what they deem an unprecedented level of
violence. In doing so, they appear to make related assertions about predatory teenagers, i.e., they are
not "rehabilitatable," and so the criminal court will more effectively protect society from their
recidivism than the juvenile court will, n132 and, these adolescents are not so different from adults
as to warrant a separate dispositional regime. n133 Although the argument that violence equals
[*34]  maturity may not be viable, other assertions of the counter-reformation can be critically
analyzed.
States began responding to the widespread perception of a major escalation in youth crime in the
1970s and 1980s in many ways. One legislative initiative lowered the age at which children enter
the juvenile system, thus extending jurisdiction to a younger group of offenders who had never
previously been at risk of delinquency adjudications. n134 A far more popular measure consisted of
reformulating jurisdictional waiver provisions to promote retribution rather than rehabilitation in the
decision to transfer juveniles to criminal court. n135 By 1996, all the states but one had amended
their laws to allow either criminal court prosecution of children aged fourteen or older charged with
serious felony offenses, or at least the sentencing of these children to criminal punishment by the
juvenile court. n136 Many states have reduced the age at which they may transfer youth from
juvenile to criminal court. n137 This modification allows criminal courts to sentence children to
periods of incarceration extending beyond the traditional terminal point of juvenile court
jurisdiction. n138 Legislatures have also expanded the catalog of criminal charges which allow and,
in many cases, require criminal courts to assume  [*35]  jurisdiction over child defendants. n139
Finally, the mechanism of the transfer decision itself has been altered. States employ three basic
approaches: judicial waiver, prosecutorial forum choice, and legislative offense exclusion. Recent
legislation has increasingly reduced the role of discretionary waiver, in which juvenile judges or
prosecutors make case-by-case decisions on the propriety of transferring a child offender to criminal
court. n140 Instead, states have more frequently relied upon statutory exclusion principles, by
which youth accused of one or more specified offenses are either automatically transferred out of
juvenile court, or by which the prosecutor initially brings the case in criminal court. n141
Jurisdictional waiver represents a policy decision to impose upon certain youth harsher
sentences than are allowable in juvenile court, and also to forego the rehabilitative options available
to those youth in that court. n142 Policymakers assume that public safety will be enhanced by the
transfer of these juveniles into  [*36]  criminal court. n143 However, most empirical research into
the effects of waiver policies has shown that jurisdictional transfer frustrates rather than furthers
public safety. These studies have concluded that transfer policies "increase the likelihood, the rate,
and the severity of reoffending and ... decrease the time to rearrest." n144 For instance, a large
Florida study compared the recidivism of juvenile offenders who were transferred to criminal court
with a matched sample of delinquents retained in the juvenile system. n145 Recidivism was
analyzed in terms of rate of repeat offending, seriousness of the new crime, and time between
release and reoffense. By every recidivism measure examined, reoffending was greater among
transfers than among the matched controls. n146
Studies in Utah and South Carolina found that extremely large proportions of cases considered
for waiver involved youth with no prior juvenile adjudications. In Utah, the proportion of such cases
was 82%; in South Carolina, 72%. n147 The lack of a juvenile placement history for such
transferees suggests at a minimum that their intractability to juvenile court processes had not been
established. Moreover, on a national scale, more juveniles were waived into criminal court for
property offenses n148 than for crimes against the person from 1987 to 1992. Thereafter, the
positions were reversed, although recently the gap has narrowed.  [*37]  In 1996, crimes against the
person accounted for 43% of waived cases, and property cases 37%. n149
Moreover, the question whether criminal courts deal more harshly with adolescents than
juvenile courts has generally been answered in the negative. One four-state analysis reported that
most juveniles waived to adult court received sentences of probation. n150 Given the youth and
inexperience of these defendants, it is likely that criminal court judges and juries viewed juvenile
misdeeds more leniently than adult violations. n151 But even those transferred juveniles who are
incarcerated "quickly reoffend at a higher rate than the nontransferred controls, thereby negating
any incapacitative benefits that might have been achieved in the short run." n152 In fact, as this
Article has suggested, the need for super-punitive measures to combat an explosion of serious
teenage crime is simply a screed expounding a false premise. The problem of teenage delinquency
is quite real, but far less ominous than the creators of the super-predator myth have postulated.
Accordingly, as the next section argues, the criminal parental responsibility laws are not only
improper but unnecessary; and, finally, the solutions suggested in this Article's third and final
section are better suited to the task of properly assessing parental responsibility for juvenile crime.
 [*38]
II
 Crime-by-Parenting: Punishing Parents for their Children's Misdeeds
 A substantial portion of the perceived increase in juvenile crime has been laid at the feet of asserted
flaws in parenting. n153 The accusation is blunt: "Parents are largely to blame for the delinquent
acts of their children." n154 Parental responsibility laws have become popular mechanisms
designed to induce increased parental control of their children by holding parents criminally
responsible when their children commit delinquent acts. These laws implicitly presume parental
omnipotence, and result in "parents being punished not for their own acts or omissions, but for those
of their children." n155 They often allow for inadequate parental supervision of children to be
shown solely by one or more juvenile delinquency contacts, and include sanctions such as periods
of incarceration and fines, requirements to attend counseling and parental education classes, and
orders for the parents to make restitution to the victims of their child's delinquency. n156
Contemporary criminal laws sanctioning parental supervision stem from older enactments
penalizing adults for contributing to the delinquency or endangering the welfare of minors. n157
These  [*39]  forerunners have their genesis in the laws initially propagating the juvenile court
philosophy. The earliest appeared in Colorado's first juvenile court enactment in 1903, which
included a provision punishing adults for "contributing to the delinquency of children." n158 Judge
Ben B. Lindsey, who was most responsible for its passage, termed it "the adult delinquent law,"
n159 and believed it was "the most important feature" of the new juvenile court statute. n160 The
law specified that any parent or guardian "responsible for, or by any act encouraging, causing or
contributing to the delinquency of such child" was guilty of a misdemeanor. n161 Punishment
included imprisonment for up to one year, a fine not to exceed $ 1,000, or both. n162 The statute
also authorized the court to suspend the sentence and "impose conditions upon any person found
guilty." n163
Embodying "the broad purpose ... to stamp out juvenile delinquency at its roots," n164
contributing-to-delinquency laws quickly spread throughout the United States, and today exist in
[*40]  every state except Maine. n165 Courts have generally interpreted these vaguely-worded
"mandates ... [as] salutary measures designed to protect children," n166 and so have afforded their
provisions broad sway, enforcing criminal regulation of conduct toward a child "in an unlimited
variety of ways which tends to produce or encourage or to continue conduct of the child which
would amount to delinquent conduct." n167 Although these statutes primarily address affirmative
parental misconduct, a parent may also be convicted for omissions under certain circumstances.
n168 In many jurisdictions, parents may be convicted of contributing to the delinquency of their
child even though the child has not been formally adjudicated a delinquent. n169
Typically, contributing-to-delinquency offenses are crimes of negligence, n170 although some
statutes demand a higher level of mens rea for one or more elements of the offense. n171 They are
[*41]  generally punished as misdemeanors, n172 but not always. n173 Contributing-to-delinquency
laws also cast a broad net to encompass harmful conduct to children, committed not only by parents
and caretakers, but by any adult. n174 Recent enactments by states and municipalities have
significantly altered the focus of legal proscriptions in order to hold parents criminally responsible
in connection with their children's behavior. These newer parental responsibility laws evince
radically diminished concern with child welfare and instead concentrate on the protection of
society. n175 At the heart of both sets of laws, however, is an inflated view of parental influence on
delinquency, and an inadequate appreciation of the uneven developmental road followed by most
adolescents.
A. A Complex Relationship, Overly Simplified
 The juvenile court enactments and their companion contributing-to-delinquency laws reflected a
unified view of parent-child relationships. As noted above, the initial revolution in the law's
treatment of delinquent youths involved both the removal of children from exposure to the adult
world of criminal courts, and the substitution of "parental" guidance in the shape of juvenile judges
and their social work staffs. n176 But if the children were displaced from the traditional courts, so
too were their families dislodged as the central caretakers and rule makers for those children. n177
The ostensibly more lenient regime of the juvenile court was justified on grounds that troublesome
youth were generally a product of troubled environments. n178 Since parents were  [*42]  primarily
responsible for the households in which delinquents were raised, those parents needed to be held
accountable for their failures, or at least legally dissuaded from fostering future delinquents.
Accordingly, contributing-to-delinquency statutes were enacted to prevent parents, and other adults
in the orbit of the protected children, from leading youth astray. n179 Although obviously an
overstatement, the apogee of this view was: "There are no delinquent children; there are only
delinquent parents." n180
The question of parental influence over children's anti-social behaviors is quite complex,
although often it is overly simplified in a reductionist effort to blame parents for their children's
wrongs. n181 As with the controversy over the proper disposition of violent juveniles, the present
argument over the causal relationship between parenting and juvenile delinquency reprises a debate
at least a half-century old. In 1948, Judge Paul W. Alexander observed that the "world is now full of
people who have just discovered that juvenile delinquency is largely traceable to delinquent parents,
and who would curb the former by punishing the latter." n182 He published the results of an
informal study of 500 parents charged with the crime of contributing-to-delinquency, concluding
that it is "generally impossible to punish the parent without at the same time punishing the child or
the rest of  [*43]  the family" n183 and finding "no evidence that punishing parents has any effect
whatsoever upon the curbing of juvenile delinquency" n184 or in "deterring other parents from
contributing." n185
The other side of the debate was equally certain: "Punish the parents, they say. Jail them. Fine
them. Hold them to account for the misdeed of their children, and the rising trend of juvenile
delinquency will be reversed." n186 Legislation often recapitulated this account of cause-and-effect,
seeking to sanction the parents in an effort to restrain juvenile delinquency. n187 In the 1950s,
Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover maintained that "the abdication of
parental responsibility is resulting in the tragic anarchy of juvenile delinquency." n188 He admitted
that isolating a sole cause for delinquency was difficult, but reported that parental misfeasance "is
reflected with monotonous regularity in case after case as a basic causal factor." n189 Hoover
expressed the belief that juvenile delinquency would decline "if  [*44]  parents could in some
manner be shocked into a realization of their full responsibility." n190 He noted with approval cases
in which parents had been incarcerated and received suspended jail sentences as a result of failing to
properly discharge their parental obligations. n191 A 1954 U.S. Children's Bureau conference was
dedicated to ascertaining the level of parents' responsibility for juvenile delinquency, and then
determining solutions to the problem. n192 It achieved consensus only as to the "multiplicity of
elements to be dealt with in connection with juvenile delinquency, the fact that no single source can
be singled out for blame and no single method relied on for improvement." n193 Decades of further
research have not bettered that formulation. n194
More recent studies confirm that parental control of children's actions-particularly adolescent
behavior-is far weaker than generally believed. The nurture-nature debate has recently emphasized
the critical importance of children's genetic inheritance. While parental efforts to effect how their
offspring mature are certainly important, children's personalities are now seen as more the product
of their genetic makeup than of their family environment. n195 Numerous studies have shown that
"the interfamilial  [*45]  variance in personality is about the same as the intrafamilial variance -
once you control for genes... . Childhood events - even childhood trauma - and childrearing appear
to have only weak effects on adult life." n196 Given the predominance of genetic disposition over
behaviors learned at home, it may be unreasonable to hold parents responsible for their children's
actions. n197
The parent-child bond is complex and not totally understood. Moreover, the biological and
social factors that might lead a child to commit violent anti-social acts are profoundly imbricated.
n198 One study documented that "experiences in infancy which result in the child's inability to
regulate strong emotions are too often the overlooked source of violence in children and adults."
n199 Such a finding suggests that parental involvement at the pre-toddler stage can have significant
effects in channeling a child's social development. This conclusion provides scant support for the
criminal parental responsibility laws' two interrelated premises: First, that the misbehavior of an
adolescent "is primarily due to the parents' actions or inactions and not to other factors," n200 and
second, that parents can control anti-social behavior  [*46]  by their teenagers. n201 Another
hallmark study, led by criminologist Dorothy O. Lewis, also highlighted the impact of brain deficits
and early trauma upon later juvenile criminality:
 In reviewing the medical histories of violent juvenile delinquents, Lewis found a significantly
higher incidence of neuropsychiatric and cognitive impairments among the most aggressive
offenders, including hyperactivity, impulsivity, attention deficits, and learning disabilities. Both
prenatal complications and serious accidents or injuries appeared often in their histories. The parts
of the brain responsible for judgment, impulse control, and reality testing are disproportionately
impaired in this population, along with the capacity for empathy and the ability to accurately
interpret the actions and intent of other people. n202
 [*47]
 Apart from reinforcing the preeminence of the genetic role, research also supports the dominance
of children's peer groups over their parents in shaping the juvenile personality. n203
There is, of course, no question that parenting influences children's behavior. n204 But the idea
that parents may exercise sufficient control over their children, particularly adolescents, is unproven
by any research. "We simply do not ... know enough to state with confidence that the way a specific
parent raises a child is the legal cause of a child's violent behavior." n205 One commentator seeking
the elusive justification for the parental liability laws observed that, since they lack "empirical
validation of their efficacy," their adoption "appears based entirely on folk wisdom that parents
should be 'in control' of their children at all times." n206
Moreover, by imposing all the burdens on the parents, such laws may also teach children the
wrong lesson on taking responsibility: that the parent, and not the child, is primarily at risk for the
child's delinquent behavior. n207 Some parents may, of course, react to the threat of criminal
sanctions stemming from their children's delinquencies by "over-parenting," that is, by either
severely restricting their child's freedom of action or by excessively punishing the child.
Punishment of the parents, in this context, will likely "embitter[ ] and brutalize[ ] more often than it
reforms  [*48]  and rehabilitates." n208 Conversely, other parents may react by "under-parenting,"
that is, by seeking to divest themselves of accountability for seriously recalcitrant children by filing
ungovernability or similar petitions in order to transfer responsibility for their children to the state,
or by encouraging children to emancipate themselves through other statutory means. n209 Parental
responsibility laws may thus "backfire by persuading more parents to distance themselves from
their difficult youngsters rather than face the possibility - if they fail - of being fined or spending
time behind bars." n210 Neither "over-parenting" nor "under-parenting" benefits the child, the
parents, or the larger community.
Sometimes the problems are insurmountable, even for the best parents. n211 Parental efforts to
channel their children toward productive lives may be counterproductive: "in the most serious cases,
the child will have developed behaviors primarily aimed at undermining adults' attempts to bring
about change in the child's behaviors." n212 Laws that effectively punish parents for their children's
errant behavior will likely convert parents and children into adversarial parties in the home, the
environment in which that stance is least helpful. Fining or even briefly jailing parents may deprive
not only the child whose conduct triggered the court's action, but also any siblings, of at least some
measure of  [*49]  the parents' financial and personal support. n213 In vetoing a parental
responsibility bill in 1956, New York Governor Averell Harriman articulated the theory that these
laws may cause more harm than good. Prosecuting parents when their children commit delinquent
acts might "lead to strains in families where relationships already are tense and might even give to
troublesome delinquents a weapon against their parents which they would not hesitate to use." n214
None of this suggests that parents are insignificant figures in their children's lives. However, by any
research standard, the question of a linkage between parenting and delinquency is far more complex
than these laws acknowledge. n215
B. Parenting as a Public Welfare Offense
1. Background and Overview
 The new generation of parental responsibility laws have refocused the criminal law's treatment of
parental involvement in juvenile delinquency. n216 The legal spotlight has shifted from the  [*50]
problem of child protection to seeking protection from the problem child. Accordingly, the new
laws governing parenting evince only passing reference to the traditional rehabilitative foundations
of juvenile justice, in which both the parents and the broader society were primarily concerned with
the welfare of the child. Instead, they focus on the failure to comply with parental duties. They are
intended to induce action, and to punish parents for failure to act, with the hope of preventing
further injury to those whom the parent's child has already harmed and to other potential victims.
n217 Many of these laws target improper parenting methods with a degree of specificity sharply in
contrast to the vague locutions contained in the contributing-to-delinquency statutes. n218 As well,
some of these novel enactments rely on strict criminal liability in lieu of the mens rea of negligence
needed to establish guilt. n219
The enlargement of parental criminal responsibility parallels an expansion in the civil liability
parents face as a consequence of their children's acts. n220 A brief examination of the present  [*51]
course of parental civil liability will illuminate the issue at hand, for both civil and penal legislation
respond to similar social needs and legal priorities. At common law, parents could not properly be
sued for harm caused by their children's intentional behavior unless the damages resulted from
parental action or omission. n221 The parent-child relationship by itself provided no platform on
which to base recovery: "there is no general responsibility for the rearing of incorrigible children."
n222 The specific circumstances under which parents could be held civilly responsible at common
law paralleled some of the conditions precedent for modern criminal liability. The parent's behavior
became actionable if he or she directed or later ratified the act; n223 if the child was acting  [*52]
as the parent's agent; n224 was entrusted with a dangerous instrumentality, such as a firearm n225
or automobile; n226 or if the parent's negligence proximately caused the harm, n227 such as if the
parent failed "reasonably to restrain the child from vicious conduct, when the parent has knowledge
of the child's propensity toward such conduct." n228
No matter how heinous the behavior of the child, unless the case fit within one of the specified
exceptions, the heart of the common law rule precluded parental liability without fault. Moore v.
Crumpton n229 clearly illustrates this principle. A severely physically and psychologically troubled
seventeen-year old boy abused alcohol and drugs, then broke into the plaintiff's home and raped her.
The trial court reflected on the "modern American family tragedy" n230 that the case represented,
but granted summary judgment for the seventeen-year-old's parents. Acknowledging the reality of
an adolescent's family life, the court concluded that "short of standing guard over the child twenty-
four hours a day, there was little that the defendant father could do to prevent [his son] from leaving
the home after the father was asleep." n231
 [*53]  The revival of interest in juvenile delinquency reform in the 1950s included statutory
expansion of the common law limits on parental civil liability. n232 All fifty states now have
statutes imposing some type of vicarious tort liability on parents for damages resulting from their
children's acts. n233 These statutes generally emphasize delinquency prevention over
compensation. n234 Even though distributive justice - apportioning the loss to the tortfeasor's
family rather than the victim's - logically supports these statutes' rationale, deterring juvenile
delinquency supplies a far more important rationale for these laws. n235 For example, Georgia's
enactment specifically avers its aim "to provide for the public welfare and aid in the control of
juvenile delinquency, not to provide restorative compensation to victims." n236 The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed these laws' consonance with the "resurgence of the belief that parents
should take responsibility for their children's activities." n237
 [*54]  This resurgent belief has influenced parallel modifications in criminal law.
Contemporary laws criminalizing parental supervision are characterized by two traits: a greater
specificity as to the forbidden actions which will trigger parental liability, and sometimes the
jettisoning of any mens rea requirement for the parents' conviction. Illustrations of the first feature
are contained in two early statutes, one enacted in Rhode Island in 1956 n238 and the other in
Illinois five years later. n239 These edicts criminalized "improper supervision," which - unlike
earlier proscriptions in contributing-to-delinquency statutes n240 - received detailed definition, at
least with regard to the juvenile behaviors for which the parent could be held responsible. The
Rhode Island provision inventoried the disallowed conduct:
 permitting ... such child to habitually associate with vicious, immoral, or criminal persons, or to
grow up in ignorance, idleness, or crime, or to wander about the streets of any city in the nighttime
without being in any lawful business or occupation, or to enter any house of ill fame, policy shop, or
place where any gambling is carried on or gaming device is operated, or to enter any place where
intoxicating liquors are sold. n241
 The Illinois statute rivaled Rhode Island's attention to detail, but it cataloged a slightly different but
overlapping set of evils, penalizing the parent of a child who "associates with known thieves,
burglars, felons, narcotic addicts or other persons of ill repute, visits a place of prostitution, commits
a lewd act, commits an act tending to break the peace or violates a municipal curfew ordinance."
n242 A similar legislative itemization typifies modern parental responsibility laws on both the state
and local levels. n243
 [*55]  A 1974 New Mexico provision anticipated the modern shift to strict liability, the other
key aspect of some modern criminal parental responsibility statutes. While the New Mexico statute
did not specify the level of intent required for conviction of a parent, n244 a state appellate court
interpreted the law as holding parents strictly liable, relying on the long-standing "special
protection" enjoyed by children. n245 Recent criminal laws have  [*56]  similarly subjected parents
to strict criminal liability on the basis of their children's acts; n246 furthermore, a substantial
increase in the number of bills to be introduced in state legislatures making parents culpable for
their children's criminal acts has been predicted. n247 Several states have adopted strict criminal
parental liability in enforcing compulsory school attendance laws. n248 Parental responsibility laws
imposing strict liability have also been enacted on the municipal level. n249
 [*57]
2. Employing Strict Criminal Liability against Parents
 Although primitive English law was most likely grounded in nearly absolute liability for harm,
n250 the common law gradually and firmly evolved the position Blackstone summarized over two
centuries ago, that "to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be first a vicious will, and
secondly an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will." n251 Beginning in the middle of the
nineteenth century, however, legislatures began crafting laws imposing criminal liability without
fault. n252 These laws often emanated from a conviction that the increasingly urbanized and
industrialized pace of modern life demanded legal regulations that could be enforced quickly,
without the "old cumbrous machinery of the criminal law, designed to try the subjective
blameworthiness of individual offenders." n253 Often these laws  [*58]  originated out of a sense
that the public interest would be better served if prosecutors were freed from the burden of
establishing individual culpability. n254 Given the relatively minor penalties generally, n255 but
not always, n256 attached to strict liability offenses, the balance between a generalized public
welfare and an individualized assessment of blameworthiness has been overwhelmingly tilted in
favor of the community interest in these laws. n257
Contemporary parental responsibility laws often aim at the same target, seeking to effect
salutary social change while discarding traditional culpability concerns. Parents now have a two-
fold obligation: to care for their children n258 and to control them. n259 The difference between
these two categories is critical to understanding the nature and impact of the new laws. The  [*59]
first-named duty reflects the traditional focus on "forces external to the child that affect the child's
own welfare." n260 Parental liability in this area is generally defined by the contributing-to-
delinquency legislation that expanded the common law duty. Thus, the typical obligation not to
"fail[ ] or refuse[ ] to exercise reasonable diligence in the control of [a] child to prevent him from
becoming a neglected, dependent or delinquent child," n261 concentrates the parents on their
preeminent duty to safeguard their child's well-being. The community interest in avoiding the
socially deleterious consequences of neglected, dependent, and delinquent minors is secondary to
the child protection core of these statutes. n262
By contrast, the parental duty to control the child centers on the "child's actions and their effect
on third parties," n263 and forms the subject matter of the parental responsibility laws. This
transition is significant, for it "highlights a shift from modern statutory efforts focused on child
welfare to postmodern efforts focused on protecting society from dangerous children." n264
Contemporary parental responsibility laws are "intended to address situations where parents have
failed to act responsibly and reasonably in the supervision of their minor children to the detriment
of the general public." n265 A recent Salt Lake City ordinance articulates the centrality of the
parental obligation to protect the public by controlling their children:
 The increasing number of criminal episodes committed by children ... demonstrates the breakdown
of meaningful parental supervision of children. Those who bring children into the world or assume
a parenting role, but fail to effectively train, guide, teach and control them, should be accountable at
[*60]  law. Those who need assistance and training should be aided. Those who neglect their
parenting duties should be encouraged to be more diligent through criminal sanctions, if necessary.
n266
 In 1995, Oregon enacted an "improper supervision" statute that imposed criminal liability on a
parent whose child either "commits an act that brings the child within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court," "violates a curfew," or "fails to attend school." n267 The statute provided for no-fault
culpability unless the parent established certain affirmative defenses. n268 The following year
Idaho enacted a statute permitting its cities and counties to "establish and enforce the offense of
failure to supervise a child." n269 The statute directed that ordinances drafted under this provision
would hold parents strictly liable unless they prove an affirmative defense. n270
A variety of municipal ordinances similarly punish parents for their children's delinquencies.
n271 These laws generally itemize parental obligations, and often impose strict criminal liability. In
reciting a table of "thou shalts," these ordinances aim both at supplying the parent with a punch-list
of obligations and at ordaining a measuring rod for parental failure. For example, the Parental
Responsibility Ordinance of the City of St. Clair Shores, Michigan, prefaces its catalog of
obligations with a general direction to parents to obey the "continuous duty ... to exercise reasonable
control to prevent the minor from committing any delinquent act." n272 In referring only to the
prevention of delinquency, the law demonstrates a difference from contributing-to-delinquency
laws, which, despite their title, always include a legislative concern with the neglect or abuse of the
parent's own child. This focus on social benefit, and concomitant indifference to individual child
welfare, is representative of this legislative genre. n273 The ordinance defines a minor as any
person under the  [*61]  age of eighteen years residing with a parent, n274 and recites the
"continuous duty of the parent of any minor to exercise reasonable control to prevent the minor
from committing any delinquent act." n275 The ordinance then elaborates several parental
obligations included within the general duty:
 1. To keep illegal drugs or illegal firearms out of the home and legal firearms locked in places that
are inaccessible to the minor.
2. To know the Curfew Ordinance of the City of St. Clair Shores, and to require the minor to
observe the Curfew Ordinance ... .
3. To require the minor to attend regular school sessions and to forbid the minor to be absent
from class without parental or school permission.
4. To arrange proper supervision for the minor when the parent must be absent.
5. To take the necessary precautions to prevent the minor from maliciously or wilfully
destroying real, personal, or mixed property which belongs to the City of St. Clair Shores, or is
located in the City of St. Clair Shores.
6. To forbid the minor from keeping stolen property, illegally possessing firearms or illegal
drugs, or associating with known juvenile delinquents, and to seek help from appropriate
governmental authorities or private agencies in handling or controlling the minor, when necessary.
n276
 Based on the foregoing portions of the ordinance, a parent's conviction requires proof that the
parent violated the "continuous duty ... to exercise reasonable control." n277 Proof of a violation
[*62]  of any of the six specified duties subsumed within the general duty would also suffice. The
ordinance also provides that a violation by a child constituting a misdemeanor or civil infraction
"shall be prima facie evidence that said parent or guardian failed to exercise reasonable parental
control." n278 Thus, the ordinance also allows the conviction of the parent for the conduct of the
child, unless the "prima facie" case is rebutted by the parent. n279
Compulsory school attendance provisions constitute another category of contemporary parental
responsibility laws reflecting the transition from primary concern for child welfare to a focus  [*63]
on public safety. Laws regulating excessive school absences have traditionally been characterized as
measures "to ensure the proper education of children." n280 Minimum attendance standards were
aimed at benefitting schoolchildren by preventing [them] from being kicked out and to save them
from the street. n281 Consistent with the community protection stress of general parental
responsibility laws, contemporary anti-truancy provisions target the prevention of crime by truant
children. n282 Criminal sanctions for parents as a result of their children's truant behavior are
common. n283
Anti-truancy laws frequently hold parents strictly liable for a criminal offense when their
children miss excessive amounts of school. For example, the city of Hazel Park, Michigan, recently
passed an ordinance punishing parents criminally for the excessive absence of their children from
school. n284 The law imposes criminal penalties on the parents, including a possible $ 500 fine and
up to ninety days in jail. n285 Tennessee has passed a similar truancy law applicable on the state
level. n286 Like the Hazel Park ordinance, Tennessee law incorporates jail time into its truancy
[*64]  statutes. n287 Other states have passed similar statutes with penalties ranging from fines to
jail terms. n288
In addition to relying on strict criminal liability, both general parental responsibility laws and
compulsory attendance provisions utilize what appears, at first glance, to be vicarious liability.
These laws are often structured so that specified undesirable behavior on the part of the child - with
no culpable action or omission of duty by the parent - constitutes the entire basis for the parent's
conviction. n289 For example, Oregon's "failing to supervise a child" statute permits the conviction
of the parent if the child does one of three things: violates a law or ordinance of the United States, a
state, county, or city; n290 violates any curfew law; n291 or fails to attend public school regularly.
n292 Idaho's enabling statute contains similar provisions. n293 The Parental Responsibility
Ordinance of St. Clair Shores, Michigan, proclaims that the adjudication of a minor as responsible
for a misdemeanor or violation "shall be prima facie evidence that said parent or guardian failed to
exercise reasonable parental control," which constitutes a violation of the ordinance by the parent.
n294 A Silverton, Oregon, ordinance declares a parent or guardian guilty of the offense of failing to
supervise a minor if "the child has been found on private property or premises open to the public in
violation of any provision of [the] Silverton Municipal  [*65]  code." n295 Salt Lake City's
ordinance provides for conviction of the parent when the child has "committed three or more
delinquent acts within a two-calendar-year period, which events have been referred to the juvenile
court." n296 An ordinance for Fairburn, Alabama, provides that parents of repeated curfew violators
may be jailed for sixty days and fined $ 500. n297 Ordinances enacted in Madison Heights and
Roseville in Michigan go even further, providing for jails terms of up to ninety days and a fine of up
to $ 500 for the parent of any child who, within a twelve month period, commits two or more
criminal acts, or four moving traffic violations. n298 A parent whose child violates the curfew laws
in Holly, Michigan, may be jailed for one year and fined $ 500. n299
A parent's conviction under a parental responsibility law premised on the behavior of a minor
child does not demonstrate the operation of pure vicarious liability, since the parent is not being
convicted for the precise delinquent act committed by the child. n300 Pure vicarious liability is the
criminal law analogy to respondeat superior in tort law. n301 Normally employed in a business
regulatory context, the respondeat superior doctrine holds employers vicariously liable for the
tortious conduct of their employees who are acting within the scope of their duty. n302 Pure
vicarious criminal liability operates in the same manner, resulting in the imposition of criminal
sanction upon employers for criminal acts committed by their employees. n303 But the operation of
[*66]  pure vicarious liability and the version found in parental responsibility laws are so analogous
as to fairly subsume their formal difference within their functional sameness. The two scenarios
involve the complete absence of both mens rea and actus reus on the part of the individual, which
the law holds responsible for the violation. Essential to both is the status of the violator, be it
employer or parent. The triggering mechanism in each consists of unlawful behavior by someone
for whom the law has made the violator responsible. It is thus more accurate to view parental
responsibility laws as having crafted an alternative version of vicarious liability. n304
3. Constitutional and Policy Concerns
 While pure vicarious criminal liability has sometimes been extended beyond the business context,
n305 it has a short leash outside its conceptual home. Only one appellate case has examined a
statute directly seeking to impose pure vicarious criminal liability upon parents for the acts of their
children. In State v. Akers, n306 the New Hampshire Supreme Court reviewed the convictions of
two defendants related to the illegal operation of snowmobiles. The snowmobiles had been
improperly driven by the defendants' children, and the prosecution had shown neither mens rea nor
actus reus on the part of the parents. The statute in question directed that parents be held criminally
responsible for any offense committed by their children. n307 The state supreme court rejected the
argument that the convictions should be upheld pursuant to the state's vicarious criminal liability
provision, n308  [*67]  which was taken directly from the Model Penal Code n309 and rendered an
actor criminally liable for the conduct of another when the former "is made accountable for the
conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense." n310 The court noted that this
provision normally applied in scenarios featuring employees and agents, and "no suggestion is made
that it was intended to authorize imposing vicarious criminal liability on one merely because of his
status as a parent." n311 The court briefly explored the religious and moral bases of parenthood in
order to emphasize the inappropriateness of the convictions in this case. In so doing, the court
concluded, "we are convinced that the status of parenthood cannot be made a crime." n312
In Doe v. City of Trenton, n313 a New Jersey appeals court examined a municipal ordinance's
presumption that a parent was criminally responsible for the misbehavior of a child who twice
within a year was adjudged guilty of violations of the public peace. The ordinance in question
indicated the presumption's effect as follows: "it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal by competent
evidence that the parents of said minor during said period of time, allowed, permitted or suffered
said minor to commit a violation of the public peace." n314
The court noted that the use of presumptions in criminal cases raised issues of constitutional
dimension related to the Due Process Clause. n315 Fundamentally, presumptions "must possess
certain qualities of trustworthiness," n316 and the court took guidance in United States Supreme
Court precedent: "A criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary,'
and hence unconstitutional, unless is can at least be said with substantial assurance that the
presumed fact is more likely than  [*68]  not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to
depend." n317
In considering the application of the Trenton ordinance, the court found that having two prior
juvenile adjudications within one year does not render it more likely than not that the second
resulted from parental negligence. n318 The presumed fact, "parental responsibility for delinquent
acts of the child," does not naturally flow from the proved fact, "a second adjudication within one
year." n319 The court relied on expert opinion in concluding that "parental actions are but a single
factor in the interaction of forces producing juvenile misconduct." n320 Accordingly, the appellate
court struck down the ordinance as not comporting with due process. n321
Surprisingly, State v. Akers n322 and Doe v. City of Trenton n323 are the only two appellate
cases which have considered the constitutionality of criminal parental responsibility laws that
impose strict liability. n324 In both Akers and City of Trenton, the laws in question were struck
down as unconstitutional. n325 These decisions were almost certainly correctly decided, and when
examined in the light of the Supreme Court's exposition of the applicable constitutional doctrine,
they strongly counsel that the current wave of parental responsibility laws similarly violate the Due
Process Clause.
In 1970, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the presumption of innocence. n326 In re
Winship established the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
right  [*69]  to counsel, taken together, entitle a criminal defendant to a jury determination that he is
guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." n327 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state's practice of
requiring that homicide defendants prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they killed in a
sudden heat of passion, based on adequate provocation. n328 As the Court later explained,
Mullaney invalidated a statutory scheme whereby a "presumption subject to rebuttal relieved the
State of its due process burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
n329 In Patterson v. New York, the Court trimmed a possibly overbroad reading of Mullaney,
declining to require a state to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact constituting any and
all affirmative defenses related to the culpability of an accused." n330 However, Patterson left
untouched the rule forbidding "shifting of the burden of persuasion with respect to a fact which the
State deems so important that it must be either proved or presumed." n331 Thus, while legislatures
may freely choose the elements which define crimes, the Court placed a limit upon state authority to
reallocate the traditional burden of proof. n332 Indeed, Patterson reaffirmed the essence of the
Mullaney holding "that a State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that it may not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient
upon proof of the other elements of the offense." n333
 [*70]  In determining what facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, "the state
legislature's definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive." n334 The legislative
authority may reallocate burdens of proof by labeling as affirmative defenses at least some elements
of crimes, but "there are obvious constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this
regard." n335 One major limit on legislative discretion is that a state's definition of an offense
violates due process if "it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." n336
Criminal parental responsibility laws rely on presumptions and affirmative defenses to facilitate
a parent's conviction. A presumption is normally defined as "a standardized practice under which
certain facts are held to call for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other
facts." n337 As in civil cases, presumptions in criminal cases are frequently used to shift the burden
of proof or the burden of persuasion. But presumptions in criminal law implicate constitutional
guarantees that proof sufficient for conviction be found beyond a reasonable doubt. n338 Where the
elements of a crime are A, B, and C, the use of a presumption allows the prosecution to adduce
proof on A and B and suggest to the fact finder that it may therefore infer the existence of C. n339
A prima facie case operates in a fashion similar to a criminal presumption, since it allows for
conviction  [*71]  upon a showing of specified proof which, if unrebutted, allows the fact-finder to
infer the guilt of the defendant. n340 For example, one such law declares that "an adjudication that
said minor has violated a provision of this code which is a misdemeanor or a finding that said minor
is responsible for a violation of this code which is deemed a civil infraction shall be prima facie
evidence that said parent or guardian failed to exercise reasonable parental control." n341
A permissive presumption allows the trier of fact to infer one element of the crime from proof of
another. n342 In County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, the Supreme Court cautioned that a
presumption will be constitutionally invalid if it undermines the factfinder's responsibility to
ascertain the existence of the essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. n343
Permissive presumptions satisfy constitutional standards only if the connection between the "basic"
facts proved and the presumed "ultimate" fact is rational, either on its face or as applied. n344 A
rational connection exists if it is more likely than not that the presumed fact flows from the proven
facts. n345 As discussed in Section III.A., the key operating assumption of the parental
responsibility laws, that all parents have the power to effectively control their teenage children, is
palpably untrue. n346
Cases evaluating permissive presumptions generally focus on common-sense, life experience
expectations. n347 A presumption  [*72]  that a violation of law by a minor results from a failure of
parental supervision violates this type of ordinary expectation. That a child has committed a
delinquent act does not naturally suggest that the parent has violated the law's standard of parental
obligation. Thus, rendering parents criminally responsible when their children disobey the law
converts the parents into guarantors of their children's lawfulness, a status not rationally derivable
from the fulfillment of parental duty.
Drafters of some of the parental responsibility laws apparently recognized the unprecedented
expansion of strict liability that these provisions represent, for several of these laws contain burden-
shifting provisions to mitigate the naked imposition of absolute liability. Affirmative defenses are
those that shift to defendants both the burdens of production and persuasion. The accused must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defense exists, and defendants bear the risk of
nonpersuasion; the jury is instructed to resolve uncertainty against them. n348 The constitutionality
of a law allocating the burden of proof of an affirmative defense to the defendant depends on how a
legislature defines the elements of the crime. n349 In the parental responsibility laws, the specifics
of whatever actions parents took or failed to take become relevant only if the parents avail
themselves of the statutorily-defined affirmative defenses. n350 Defendant parents may adduce
proof that they took reasonable steps to properly supervise their children, n351 and that they
reported  [*73]  their child's delinquent acts to the police or other authorities, n352 or that they were
the victims of their child's act. n353
These affirmative defenses may appear to soften the rigidity of the parental criminal
responsibility laws, but they cannot rectify the irrational premise of these laws. The underlying
assumption of these laws remains the untenable proposition that the parent's criminal failure to
supervise a child is to be inferred by the commission of one or more delinquent acts by the child. At
bottom, these laws allow prosecutors to charge parents for the acts of their children, relieving the
state or municipality of any need to establish a connection between the parental conduct or omission
[*74]  and the child's delinquent act. The defendant parents then must bear the burden of proving
that they are innocent parents who should not be convicted. n354
By the constitutional standards set forth above, the parental responsibility laws discussed in this
Article violate due process. In presuming parents guilty of one offense merely because their
children have committed a different offense, they effectively discard the presumption of innocence,
in violation of the longstanding rule that "it is not within the province of a legislature to declare an
individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime." n355 Similarly, the laws in question relieve
the prosecution of the burden of establishing any connection between any behavior by the parent
and the harm addressed by the statute. In so doing, these laws discard the proviso that the
Constitution places beyond permissible legislative reach the power to decree that "mere proof of the
identity of the accused[ ] should create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essential to
guilt." n356 In this respect, the parental responsibility laws constitute proscribed "status offenses."
n357
In public policy terms, the prime reason to reject the current formulation of parental
responsibility laws is their incipient transformation of poor parenting, or sometimes even good
parenting, into a new public welfare offense. Public welfare offenses have been termed
"administrative misdemeanors," n358 and that phrase encapsulates the bureaucratic convenience
rationale for this legal regime. n359 Dean Sayre's description of the process has not lost its cogency
even after nearly seventy years:
 [*75]
 The new emphasis being laid upon the protection of social interests fostered the growth of a
specialized type of regulatory offense involving a social injury so direct and widespread and a
penalty so light that in such exceptional cases courts could safely override the interests of innocent
individual defendants and punish without proof of any guilty intent. n360
 But raising children is not an industry, and our repugnance at the notion of overriding the interests
of innocent parents intimates that parenting can never be a regulatory offense. One of the arguments
advanced to justify the imposition of strict liability in public welfare offenses is the inherent
dangerousness, and consequent heavy regulation, of the line of work engaged in by a defendant, and
the lack of compulsion in that defendant's choice of that field of endeavor. n361 Whatever merit this
argument may otherwise have, n362 it subverts our most revered social norms to craft a legal device
on the premise that parenthood is an essentially dangerous activity. Parenting is an inherently
positive endeavor, whose social utility has always been deemed paramount. Indeed, the substantive
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause "provides heightened protection against
governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests," including the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children. n363
It is also unacceptable to suggest that blameless parents must suffer the indignity of criminal
conviction in order to satisfy the demands for a more punitive policy toward juvenile delinquents.
The principle of "tough luck" at the heart of strict liability for public welfare offenses is particularly
inadequate as a description  [*76]  of the legal regulations with which an enlightened polity treats
parenthood. n364 Nor do offenses under the parental responsibility laws fit under the rubric of those
moral crimes which, along with public welfare offenses, have traditionally been exempted from the
mens rea requirement. n365
Indeed, the fundamental reason why strict liability should never be the standard for evaluating
offenses associated with parenting is precisely the legal importance and moral necessity of good
parenting. By inappropriately relying on the imposition of strict and vicarious liability, and by
reversing the burden of proof, parental responsibility laws presumptively convict the parent and
only afterwards evaluate the parenting. Despite the allowance of some affirmative defenses,
parental responsibility laws primarily focus on "juvenile outcomes rather than on the skills that
constitute proper parenting." n366 The parental responsibility laws neither distinguish, nor even
make a serious effort to differentiate, harmful from appropriate parenting. When parents truly
commit crimes against their children, they should be subject to full legal condemnation. Eliminating
mens rea considerations from parenting offenses ironically denigrates the social duty to condemn,
both legally and morally, despicable behavior such as child abuse that strikes at the heart of the
social order. n367
III
 The Proper Place of Parental Responsibility in Dealing with Juvenile Crime
 Part I of this Article reviewed the juvenile justice counter-reformation  [*77]  and argued that the
fear of a generation of super-predators was unwarranted. n368 Part II critiqued parental
responsibility laws that expose a wide array of innocent acts and omissions to criminal liability.
n369 The argument of this Article thus far advances two interim conclusions: (1) that the case for
treating juvenile delinquents as predatory criminals has been grossly overstated, and far less
punitive means are appropriate for the vast majority of children committing delinquent acts; and (2)
that punishing parents on the generalized assumption that they bear principal responsibility for
juvenile delinquency is also unjustifiable, and so another route for increasing parental involvement
in juvenile delinquency must be sought. Juvenile criminality is, of course, a serious problem, and
parental involvement with wayward youth is very important. What is needed, however, is a
reasoned approach to legal intervention in the relationship between parental supervision and
juvenile crime, which addresses the needs of community safety as well as the future course of the
delinquent.
In this final Part of the Article, I consider and evaluate two different directions for the law to
take in inducing and/or regulating parental involvement in the disposition of children's delinquency
cases. One direction involves jettisoning a culpability analysis in toto. This approach fully respects
the parental prerogatives with regard to the raising of their children, and suggests that the issue of
parental involvement in juvenile court may best be addressed within the perspective of the emerging
movement in therapeutic jurisprudence, including voluntary family group conferences, mediation,
teen courts, and other forms of alternative dispute resolution which emphasize restorative justice.
The second direction, with which this Article concludes, addresses the question of the appropriate
liability for parental misconduct in relation to juvenile delinquency. If policymakers believe that
parental liability needs to be assessed in delinquency cases, I propose that they turn from the
inappropriate assertion of criminal law jurisdiction over parents of juvenile delinquents and instead
invest the juvenile court with the power to assert jurisdiction over parents in the dispositional phase
of delinquency proceedings. n370  [*78]  Central to both approaches is a reconception of juvenile
and family courts as principally civil courts concerned with insuring the welfare and regulating the
conduct of family members, rather than as primarily criminal courts oriented to administering a
penal code for criminally susceptible children and their parents. n371
A. Involving Parents in their Children's Delinquency Cases: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Approach
 Therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent. n372
Restructuring legal processes by applying behavioral science knowledge to accomplish therapeutic
outcomes, without diluting the traditional canons of justice, lies at the core of this new
jurisprudential approach. n373 A related movement, restorative justice, focuses on crimes as
interpersonal conflicts that must be addressed by empowering the victims, communities, and even
the offenders themselves in order to repair the injury. n374 Therapeutic jurisprudence and
restorative justice  [*79]  are the "two vectors" n375 of a growing interdisciplinary movement that
considers the law itself as a social force and focuses on the therapeutic or non-therapeutic impact of
legal intervention. n376 This viewpoint distinguishes the court's role as facilitating positive
outcomes and fortifying family relationships. In its modern phase, therapeutic jurisprudence
originated in the mental health law field, n377 but its applications have been extended to many
other fields, n378 including criminal prosecutions n379  [*80]  and family law cases. n380
The therapeutic agency of law is particularly applicable to proceedings involving families in
crisis. n381 Utilizing alternative forms of dispute resolution (ADR), family members are
encouraged to meet in confidential settings with trained professionals in an attempt to resolve the
legal and social issues that have brought them to court. n382 Such techniques can include family
group conferencing, n383 mediation, n384 peer or teen courts, n385 community  [*81]  courts, n386
day treatment programs, n387 and settlement conferences. n388 The common theme uniting these
alternatives is a reordering of the processes by which decisions are made about the case. ADR
techniques do not seek to evade the responsibility of the court to decide cases, but reserve the
process of determining a court-imposed resolution until it is clear that the family members - aided
by the court's social science support staff - are unable to come to their own solution. n389
The retributive concepts that have dominated the juvenile justice counter-revolution focus on
the offender's just desserts, and the punitive measures adopted have often been presented as
responsive to crime victims. n390 However, retribution only indirectly addresses the crime victims'
concerns, except inasmuch as it assumes that victims always desire the offender to receive a  [*82]
punitive sanction. n391 Restorative justice provides a restitutive alternative to both retributive and
rehabilitative justice. n392 Restorative concepts provide a victim-oriented response to crime that
supplies a forum for the victim, the offender, their families, and community representatives, to
address the criminal harm and possible remedies:
 Restorative justice emphasizes the importance of providing opportunities for more active
involvement in the process of offering support and assistance to crime victims; holding offenders
directly accountable to the people and communities they have violated; restoring the emotional and
material losses of victims (to the degree possible); providing a range of opportunities for dialogue
and problem solving to interested crime victims, offenders, families, and other support persons;
offering offenders opportunities for competency development and reintegration into productive
community life; and strengthening public safety through community building. n393
 A brief analysis of a potential role for parents of juvenile offenders  [*83]  in family group
conferences and mediation serves to illustrate both the promise of, and limits to, using a therapeutic
jurisprudence approach to induce greater parental involvement as an alternative to the imposition of
criminal liability through parental responsibility laws. Family group conferencing (FGC) programs
were initially developed in New Zealand and have received considerable attention in many
countries, including the United States. n394 FGC principles are a staple of social work practice, and
have long been employed in family therapy and community development work. n395 In dealing
with delinquency cases, FGC involves the community most affected by the crime - the victim, the
offender, and their families - joined together by a facilitator to determine the best resolution
following a delinquent act. n396 According to the restorative justice theory, the burden for
responding to unlawful conduct does not primarily belong to the state, but rather to the victim, the
offender, and the community as a whole. n397 Participation by all involved is voluntary and the
offender must admit culpability in order to take part. n398 FGC aims to secure an apology from the
offender to the victim, acknowledge community censure, and work out an agreement to rectify the
harm both to the victim and to the community. n399
 [*84]  What role do the parents of the juvenile offender have in FGC? These parents are part of
the community that was harmed, but they also have a special role to play in assisting their child in
the process of acknowledging the harm and beginning the process of making amends. The parents
of the offender are often in a position to facilitate the reintegration of their child into the
community, a prime focus of the restorative justice/therapeutic jurisprudence movement. But the
question of the family court's authority over parents and other family members is "perhaps the
greatest uncertainty about the family court model." n400 Following the premise that restoring
family functioning is essential to the family court's mission, some commentators point out that,
because our legal system is already committed to imposing the least restrictive alternative in
delinquency dispositions, it is already "implicitly relying on parents and caretakers to shoulder the
burden of effectively supervising young offenders." n401 Further, this argument suggests that, to
the extent that the American juvenile justice system adopts FGC, "the principle that parents and
caretakers should be parties before the court in juvenile cases is being implicitly embraced." n402
Victim-offender mediation is another restorative justice concept currently advanced as a better
alternative for the resolution of some delinquency cases. n403 Mediation in juvenile cases is touted
as a method to more effectively give voice to, and serve the needs of, the crime victim, the
community, and the offender. n404  [*85]  Victims and offenders "assume active, problem-solving
roles and negotiate an agreement that is intended to restore the material and psychological losses of
the victim while impressing upon the offender the 'human impact' of his criminal conduct." n405
Seen as "more therapeutic than judgmental," n406 mediation has the ability "to produce long-term
changes and greater satisfaction for victims ... [and] increase offender accountability." n407
Unfortunately, the parental role in victim-offender mediation has not yet been well-defined. n408
A therapeutic jurisprudence approach contemplates a deviation from, or a least a reformulation
of, the traditional advocacy model of adjudication. n409 The adversary system and the frequently
protracted nature of court proceedings "can further  [*86]  splinter already fragmented family
relationships." n410 This anti-therapeutic aspect of the current legal system must be balanced
against the dangers of sacrificing individual rights in pursuit of communal goals. n411 Advocates
for a therapeutic vision of law have historically underestimated the dangers of directiveness and the
concomitant risk of lessening autonomy. n412 Mediation programs have been criticized as
inherently coercive, especially for juveniles, who may "feel either vulnerable or powerless." n413
Whether mediating with parents or with adult victims, juveniles suffer from an "inherently unequal
bargaining position," n414 due to their relative age, education, and life experience. n415
In sum, therapeutic jurisprudence provides a suitable matrix within which to locate the desire to
increase parental involvement in delinquency cases. Moreover, actively engaging parents in the
quest for restorative justice has the potential for improving  [*87]  the legal system's approach to the
child offenders, their victims, and the community as a whole. Although parental participation may
not be compelled, options such as family group conferences and victim-offender mediation suggest
innovative ways to integrate parents into their children's delinquency dispositions.
B. Making Parents Parties to their Children's Delinquency Dispositions
 Some policymakers may, however, wish to retain a method to impose liability upon parents for
failing to discharge their responsibilities adequately when their children violate the criminal law.
Accordingly, this section constructs an alternative system for enforcing parental cooperation in the
disposition of their children's delinquency cases. I propose that parents be made parties to all
juvenile delinquency actions at the disposition stage, so that they can be subject to appropriate court
orders to further the reformation of their children. Because this suggested resolution accommodates
the legitimate interests of society in regulating parental supervision, I also advocate the repeal of all
parental responsibility laws that impose criminal liability on parents stemming from the delinquent
acts of their children.
Family and juvenile courts already exercise broad jurisdiction over parents. New York's family
court, for example, may make orders respecting parents in proceedings as diverse as child support,
n416 paternity, n417 permanent termination of parental rights, n418 adoption, n419 custody and
visitation, n420 guardianship, n421 PINS (persons in need of supervision), n422 family offenses,
n423 conciliation, n424 and child abuse and neglect. n425 Nevertheless, such courts have lacked
authority to regulate the behavior of parents in juvenile delinquency proceedings. n426 In light of
juvenile courts' traditional  [*88]  purposes, the absence of this authority is hardly surprising. These
tribunals were established, in the words of the 1909 New York Juvenile Code, to "consider the child
not as upon trial for commission of a crime, but as a child in need of care and protection of the
state." n427 This phrasing aptly limits both the goal of diverting youth from the criminal courts and
the idea that the state would now take charge of supervising the child's welfare. n428 The parents
were thus rendered formally superfluous in the juvenile proceedings. "Juvenile courts ... [exist] to
be parents to the kids, and that includes all the things parents do." n429 Legislatures focused on
parents only as possible impediments to the public experiment in juvenile rehabilitation, as
evidenced by the fact that no role was specified for the parents in the new laws, except as potential
defendants in contributing-to-delinquency cases. n430
By contrast, criminal parental responsibility laws were born of multiple aims, all oriented at
increasing parental accountability for juvenile crime and the state's role in managing dangerously
violent youth. n431 They have emerged from the same legislative impulse responsible for the
common redefinitions of juvenile  [*89]  code purposes: "to protect the community against those
acts of its citizens ... which are harmful to others and ... reduce the incidence of delinquent
behavior." n432 Other indications, however, suggest that rehabilitation retains a major role in
juvenile justice. n433 Although the rhetorical friction generated by this debate often causes the
penal principles to polarize in the public mind, logically there is no unsolvable conflict between the
dual goals of community protection and malefactor rehabilitation. Too often in the past, we have
sacrificed one goal for the other and achieved neither. For example, as discussed above, treating
juvenile offenders as adults in the name of social protection has, instead, increased recidivism,
lessened rehabilitation, and diminished public safety. n434 The goals of crime suppression and
individual reformation may, in fact, be harmonized, as long as we "reject the false binary choice that
the juvenile justice system must seek to punish or rehabilitate, but not both." n435
1. The Feasibility of Regulating Parental Responsibility in Child Protective Proceedings
 Parental misconduct that causes harm to children is always  [*90]  subject to the overall control of
the criminal sanctions governing crimes against persons, such as homicide and assault.
Contributing-to-delinquency statutes are specifically designed to address acts or omissions of
parents that result in cognizable injury to children. n436 Nevertheless, criminal court actions against
parents in cases involving their children are comparatively rare; the bulk of the legal system's
regulation of parenting occurs in family courts, particularly in the child abuse and neglect
jurisdiction. n437 Would child protective proceedings provide a suitable home for entertaining the
concerns of the parental responsibility laws? This subsection explores that question.
The abuse and neglect jurisdiction of family court centers on harm to children, and its
provisions generally provide clear standards for measuring the injury and facilitating the
establishment of responsibility. The child is always the subject of the judicial inquiry, and the parent
or guardian is generally labeled the "respondent," against whom the allegations are lodged. n438
New York's Family Court Act, for example, contains detailed definitions of "abused child" and
"neglected child," to allow for the determination of a linkage between the parental misconduct and
the harm to the child. n439
 [*91]  The relative precision of the definitions reflect the drafters' effort to craft careful
guidelines to prevent "unwarranted state intervention into private family life," n440 as it is
unquestioned that "parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of society." n441 Parents have a fundamental right to raise their
children, and state intercession may only be justified to protect a child's life, health, or safety. n442
Accordingly, a child must be either harmed or under imminent danger of being harmed before abuse
or neglect  [*92]  proceedings may be brought. n443 This requirement helps ensure that the family
court concentrates on the actual or rapidly-approaching injury on the child, rather than on "parental
behavior which might not enjoy the court's approval." n444
Because the parents are responding to allegations that they abused or neglected their child, n445
the state and the parents meet in an adversarial contest in a child protective proceeding. The law
governing such a proceeding was designed "to provide a due process of law for determining when
the state ... may intervene against the wishes of a parent on behalf of a child so that his needs are
properly met." n446 Since the power of the state is arrayed against them, parents are allowed the
assistance of counsel, to be appointed by the court if they qualify. n447 Parents are also not required
to cooperate with the child protective agency investigating them. n448 The fact-finding hearing is a
full-fledged adversarial proceeding, in which parents are entitled to "the essential of due process and
fair treatment," n449 including a full opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses. n450 The
dispositional hearing must similarly afford the parents their procedural rights. n451
The power of the family court to sanction the parents is limited, however, consistent with the
child-centered remedial course of the statute. A judge may issue a warrant directing the appearance
[*93]  of the parent in court. n452 A parent may also be ordered to provide non-testimonial
evidence, such as blood, urine, hair, or other materials from his or her body. n453 But the
dispositional hearing is aimed at determining the proper treatment plan to benefit the child, not at
framing legal sanctions against the parents. n454 In this context, "the remedial powers of the Family
Court can be more effective than the punitive powers of the Criminal Court in preventing further
abuse or neglect." n455 Five dispositional alternatives are available: suspended judgment, release of
the child to the parents, placement of the child in foster care, an order of protection, and supervision
of the parents. n456
What happens if the parents violate an order of protection, n457 or fail to comply with the terms
of the order of disposition? n458 Wilful failure of the parents to comply with such orders may lead
to a reconsideration of the court's disposition, which may in turn result in the placement of the child
away from the parents' custody. n459 If, after a hearing, the court is satisfied "by competent proof"
n460 that the parent violated the order of protection or probation supervision "wilfully and without
just cause," n461 the court is authorized to revoke the prior disposition and enter "any order that
might have been made at the time the order of supervision or of protection was made." n462 The
court may also commit the  [*94]  parent to jail for up to six months. n463 But this incarceration
option turns out, both in terms of juvenile court philosophy and actual practice, to be much less than
it appears.
The purpose clause of the child protective proceedings article of New York's Family Court Act
sets out the law's design:
 to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or mistreatment and to help safeguard
their physical, mental and emotional well-being [and] ... to provide a due process of law for
determining when the state, through its family court, may intervene against the wishes of a parent
on behalf of a child so that his needs are properly met. n464
 The proceedings are civil in nature n465 and are to be clearly distinguished in purpose and intent
from criminal actions. They are not designed "to punish offenders for acts against their victims, but
to protect their victims from further harm." n466 Specifically, the family court must protect them
not "merely as victims, but as victimized children." n467 Given the family court's child-centered
philosophy, judges "are loath to order jail for an offending parent." n468 Courts prefer to conduct
proceedings to consider the disposition anew, rather than to determine sanctions against the parent.
A hearing focused on options for the child's care and placement is more in keeping with the court's
mission to safeguard the child's welfare. n469 Moreover, reconsidering the disposition allows the
court to obtain more contemporaneous information about the status of the child. n470 In serious
cases, the court "usually removes the child from the parent's custody." n471 In practice,
incarceration is almost never enforced as a sanction against the parents for wilful noncompliance.
n472
 [*95]  Of course, most parents would consider losing custody of their child to constitute an
enormous sanction. Indeed, the law proceeds on the assumption that maintaining and regaining
custody of their child will provide sufficient motivation for parents who have neglected or abused
their children to comply with the court's directives. The point here is merely that, by contrast with
the sanctions contained in the criminal parental responsibility laws, child protective proceedings
seem virtually uninterested in sanctioning parents directly.
On the surface, child protective proceedings might appear an attractive destination in which to
relocate the substance of the criminal parental responsibility laws. Child protective statutes are
intimately concerned with parenting. Indeed, they provide a legal definition of minimally competent
parenting to be enforced by the family court. n473 However, the core concerns of the two statutes
are radically different. At the heart of the parental responsibility laws resides the parental role in the
harm to society posed by the parents' child. By contrast, the sine qua non of a child protection
proceeding is the assertion that the parents have harmed their own child. At the same time, parental
responsibility proceedings are relatively unconcerned with the welfare of the parent's child; in a
child protection case, that child's welfare is nearly the exclusive focus. Finally, while the sanctions
in criminal parental responsibility cases are often punitive ones directed at the parents in order to
safeguard community safety, the ultimate remedy available to a court in a child protection
proceeding is removal of the child for the child's own safety. Given this evaluation of child
protective proceedings, they do not seem a likely forum into which the concerns of parental
responsibility laws  [*96]  may reasonably be interjected. n474 Delinquency proceedings provide a
more promising alternative. n475
2. Parents as Parties in Juvenile Delinquency Dispositions
 Another way to involve parents directly in the consequences of their children's delinquent behavior
is to make them parties to the dispositional components in juvenile delinquency proceedings
involving their children. n476 Establishing jurisdiction over  [*97]  parents will allow the juvenile
or family court to craft and enforce orders requiring the parents to participate actively in developing
a plan for their child's rehabilitation and for the cessation of the child's anti-social behavior. Family
courts are both more experienced and more effectively staffed than criminal courts to handle
parental responsibility cases and the juvenile delinquency petitions that trigger the legal action.
Moreover, even though parental responsibility laws invoke criminal jurisdiction, their sanctions
are primarily aimed at inducing parents to act more responsibly toward their children's upbringing,
rather than at punishing the parents through traditional criminal sanctions. n477 This conclusion is
not intended to gainsay the odiousness of the stigma attached to the parent as a defendant in a
parental responsibility criminal action whose consequences might include a lifetime criminal
record. Additionally, the risk of jail and fines is real, although somewhat attenuated. Indeed, the fact
that these criminal laws aim to involve parents more in stemming juvenile crime, and that, as will be
discussed in this section, many non-punitive alternatives exist that would more effectively attack the
problem, highlights the inappropriateness of using a criminal sanction when a non-criminal one
would suffice. Shifting the entire proceeding into family court will thus accommodate the aims of
the parental responsibility laws and do so both more effectively and without the stigma of a criminal
conviction.
Two examples from typical sentencing provisions found in these laws will illustrate the trend.
The Oregon parental responsibility statute imposes criminal liability, but predominantly displays a
scheme of graduated sanctions whose overall tenor is ameliorative rather than punitive. n478 On a
parent's first conviction  [*98]  under the statute, the court may not order restitution, n479 but must
instead suspend imposition of the sentence and "warn the person of the penalty for future
convictions of failing to supervise a child." n480 On a second conviction, the court may, with the
parent's consent, suspend imposition of the sentence and "order the person to complete a parent
effectiveness program approved by the court." n481 The parental responsibility ordinance of St.
Clair Shores, Michigan, manifests a similar pattern of slowly spiraling penal sanctions largely
unrelated to the actual parent-child relationship. n482 It differs from the Oregon statute primarily in
that it authorizes terms of incarceration. n483 A first conviction carries a fine of between $ 75 and $
100. n484 Upon a second conviction, the fine may range from $ 100 to $ 500, and the parent may be
sentenced to probation "with the condition that the parent participate in, through completion, a court
approved, community based treatment program (such as parenting skills, family services,
employment and training, etc.)." n485 Alternatively, the court may impose a thirty-day sentence of
incarceration. n486 Conviction on a third and subsequent violation subjects the parent to a fine of
between $ 200 and $ 500, along with imprisonment for ninety days. n487 While the sanctions in
these two sample laws directly affect the parents, they only obliquely impact the parent-child
relationship at the heart of the problem. The sentencing options in these criminal laws treat effective
child supervision as a general parenting problem to be addressed with generic parent education,
rather than as an opportunity to train the individual parents to work with their child in a supervised
effort to effect change in the condition that engendered the delinquent act. None of these sanctions,
in short, involves the parents with their own child.
The reason for this odd dissonance between the theoretical focus  [*99]  on parenting and the
concrete delinquency of the child is surprisingly simple: the court enforcing the parental
responsibility law lacks jurisdiction over the child, while the court adjudicating juvenile
delinquency has no power over the parents. Thus, the efforts of each court to deal with the problem
of youth crime and parental responsibility will likely be fractured. Balkanizing the problem in this
fashion magnifies the risk of conflicting sanctions and directions to parent and child by
uncoordinated courts. n488 Such lack of coordination also multiplies the cost to the families
involved in tracking one family problem in two separate court systems. Finally, the legal system
itself is burdened in the scheduling of multiple court sessions and in the taxing of separate resource
caches in the different courts called upon to deal with the consequences of an accusation that the
parents' improper supervision led to the child's delinquent act. Centralizing legal oversight of the
risks and duties of parents and their children in one court would not only improve judicial
efficiency, but would also allow a single court system to dovetail the efforts of both halves of the
family-in-trouble equation. The family court is in the best position to supervise both the
management of the juvenile's treatment program and the parents' role in furthering the welfare of
the child, thereby most effectively protecting society while assisting the youth in developing into a
law-abiding and productive individual. n489
Allowing the family court to exercise jurisdiction over the parents is only the beginning of the
inquiry. What sorts of powers should the court be permitted to exercise over the parents? First, we
must recognize that the principal goal of this integrated jurisdictional scheme is to change the child's
behavior, not the parent's. To justify invoking judicial power over the parents in juvenile
delinquency cases, the resulting orders to parents must be tailored to assist in the child's
reformation. Thus, for example, appropriate legislation could require that parents work with the
juvenile probation department in crafting a plan for the  [*100]  child's treatment. Parents could be
mandated to accompany their child to, and participate in, educational or counseling programs aimed
at remedying the circumstances that engendered their child's delinquent behavior. Parental
obligations in this regard could be monitored by the family court and compliance could be enforced
through the court's contempt power.
The exercise of the contempt power is, of course, laden with constitutional and logistical
burdens. Courts intending to hold recalcitrant parents in contempt must ensure that indigent parents
be provided with counsel. Nationwide, the juvenile court attorneys who would likely be called upon
to represent parents in these cases already handle overwhelming caseloads. The overburdened
system thus "impedes both access to counsel and quality of representation." n490 Making parents
parties in juvenile delinquency cases also represents a significant expansion of state supervision into
the lives of families, triggered by the filing of a delinquency petition. Moreover, the focus of a
contempt hearing would likely shift the court's attention from the welfare of the child to an
evaluation of the wilfulness of the parent's disobedience of the court order. Worse yet, the
necessities of conducting a contempt hearing in our adversary system might pit the parent against
the child in an attempt to allocate blame for a disposition plan gone awry.
Despite these very serious reservations, on balance, the contempt power might still serve a
useful purpose. The proposed contempt sanction is intended to replace the parental responsibility
laws' inappropriate and nearly standardless exercise of criminal jurisdiction over poor or simply
unlucky parents. In sharp contrast to those laws, parents made parties to a delinquency disposition
would be put on notice that failure to comply with a specific dispositional program - which they
would have had a hand in formulating - subjects them to contempt proceedings. The specificity of
notice reflecting the clear standard of behavior, reinforced by the parental involvement in crafting
the treatment option, should serve as both an inducement to compliance and a deterrent to wilful
noncompliance. Moreover, family court judges should be trusted to exercise appropriate judgment
in deciding whether the parent's lack of compliance with a court order is realistically amenable to
reparation by the mechanism of a contempt proceeding. If a contempt proceeding is commenced,
[*101]  the parent's attorney may be able to broker a resolution aimed at furthering the court's intent
to have the parents involved in a beneficial program for the child. Finally, even if the parents are
held in contempt, the range of sanctions available to a court is broad, and includes reformulation of
the parental obligation to better serve the needs of the child and the purposes of the delinquency
disposition.
Other limitations upon the exercise of jurisdiction over the parents would be required. As
discussed above, the premise of laying responsibility for juvenile delinquency primarily at the feet
of parental supervision is fallacious. n491 Accordingly, in delinquency cases the court should not
have the authority to sanction the parents in any manner, except for their failure to comply with
orders directly relating to the child's welfare. n492 The court should have no power to enforce
sanctions which may generally be advantageous to the parents, such as ordering them into
counseling programs or substance abuse treatment for themselves, even though the court may be of
the opinion that the children would also benefit. To avoid the overreaching nature of the parental
responsibility laws, the court's authority in this expanded delinquency jurisdiction must be carefully
tailored to the goal of child reformation. The proposed expanded delinquency jurisdiction would not
supply the proper forum to consider whether the parent's conduct has harmed the child. Family and
criminal courts have ample power over the parents through the commencement of proceedings
involving child abuse, n493 neglect, n494 and a panoply  [*102]  of other criminal law sanctions.
n495 Only in these proceedings may parental misconduct be properly considered, in fora which
both regulate the baseline of proper parenting and afford the parents procedural rights to contest the
accusation. n496
Some states have begun experimenting with expanding the jurisdiction of courts in delinquency
cases in order to integrate parents into the resolution of their children's delinquency problems. The
results have been mixed. Oregon has promulgated a statute authorizing the court hearing the
juvenile's case to subject the parent or guardian to the jurisdiction of the court n497 and to "order
the parent or guardian to assist the court in any reasonable manner in providing appropriate
education or counseling for the youth." n498 Despite this promising start, however, the Oregon
statute exemplifies both the best and the worst of this expanded jurisdictional power, as well as an
inappropriate penalty clause. A close reading of this statute will serve to illustrate both the strengths
and risks of this new approach to delinquency disposition. n499
On the positive side, the Oregon statute directs parents to become intimately involved in their
child's case. For example, if their child is placed on probation, the parents may be required to enter
into a contract with the juvenile department and to assist in developing a plan concerning the
"supervision and implementation of the youth's probation." n500 This plan must be "reasonably
[*103]  calculated to provide the supervision necessary to prevent further acts of delinquency given
the individual circumstances of the youth." n501 After the juvenile department and the parents have
agreed on an individualized program for the child, it must be reviewed and ratified by the court,
which then incorporates the plan into the probation order. n502 These provisions appropriately
involve parents in their child's reformation, and do so in a much more direct way than the
generalized and uncoordinated sanctions usually applied in parental responsibility cases.
However, the statute also authorizes the court to enforce sanctions directly against the parents
under the questionable rationale that their behavioral deficiencies have led to the child's
delinquency. Although such efforts are well-meaning and intended to assist the child, orders of this
type constitute a misunderstanding of the appropriate basis for expanding delinquency jurisdiction
and propel the courts into the same errors of overreaching that epitomize the parental responsibility
laws. Oregon judges are authorized by this new statute to make a finding that "the parent's or
guardian's addiction to or habitual use of alcohol or controlled substances has significantly
contributed to the circumstances bringing the youth within the jurisdiction of the court in a
[delinquency] proceeding." n503 The statute provides no guidance to the court on how to make such
a finding. It is difficult, particularly given the wealth of research on the complexity of the causes of
juvenile delinquency, n504 to imagine the standards under which such a determination might be
made in a delinquency case. n505
Once the court makes the finding of a connection between the parent's substance abuse and the
child's delinquency, "the court may conduct a special hearing to determine if the court should
[*104]  order the parent or guardian to participate in treatment and pay the costs thereof." n506
Recognizing that such a finding fundamentally alters the parent's role in the child's delinquency
case, converting it into a fully adversarial one between the state and the parent, the statute
designates that certain procedural rights attend the decision of the court to conduct the "special
hearing." n507 Notice of the hearing "shall be by special petition and summons to be filed by the
court and served upon the parent or guardian." n508 A contested evidentiary hearing is probably
contemplated, as the statute provides for the participation of an attorney for the parent. The court
must appoint counsel for the parent if he or she qualifies under the standards applicable if the parent
were a criminal defendant. n509 The dispositional order must be in writing and "contain appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law." n510 At the hearing, the "best interest of the child"
standard is determinative: "If ... the court finds it is in the best interest of the youth for the parent or
guardian to be directly involved in treatment, the judge may order the parent or guardian to
participate in treatment." n511
The statute also authorizes the court to require the parents to attend educational or counseling
programs aimed at improving parenting skills, if the court finds that a deficiency in such skills "has
significantly contributed to the circumstances bringing the youth within the jurisdiction of the
court" n512 and that the parents' participation would be "consistent with the best interests of the
youth." n513 Although the process is similar to that followed before the parent may be ordered to
attend drug or alcohol treatment, the threshold requirements are relaxed. No notice, appointment of
counsel, or hearing are required. While the lack of procedural protections in this portion of the
statute reflects the view that counseling and educational programs do not infringe on individual
liberty to the same extent as substance abuse treatment,  [*105]  the court's orders in this area are
subject to the same objection. Counseling is not necessarily less intrusive than substance abuse
treatment. All orders of this nature are problematic, because sanctions should be placed on the
parents only in cases in which the parents behavior may be causally shown, through proceedings
admitting of appropriate proof, to have resulted in harm to the child. In those cases, criminal
endangerment or child protective proceedings should be brought against the parents, so that these
serious allegations may be subject to adequate proof. The focus of parental involvement in
delinquency cases should be on the child's own treatment and on the parents' role in facilitating their
child's development.
Finally, the Oregon statute unnecessarily restricts the ability of the court to enforce its orders.
Rather than allow the court to enforce its legitimate orders through its contempt power, the state
legislature chose to affix a monetary penalty to violation of court orders in these cases. A parent or
guardian who violates a court order in the delinquency proceeding is subject to pay up to $ 1,000.
n514 Disallowing the use of the contempt sanction results in lessened weight to the sanction for
noncompliance for parents of both the high and low-end economic classes. A $ 1,000 penalty is
negligible to an upper-class parent, and likely impossible to collect from a poor parent. n515 The
inappropriate use of monetary sanctions to punish noncompliance is a feature of several other states'
efforts in this area. n516 By contrast, some statutes acknowledge  [*106]  the importance of courts'
ability to enforce compliance of their orders with contempt. n517 There is no reason to limit a
court's ability to enforce its orders in delinquency cases.
As the preceding discussion has suggested, there are problems with the expansion of the
delinquency jurisdiction of the family court into the realm of regulating parental responsibility. On
balance, however, it appears to offer a solid opportunity for legal reform in this area. n518 The
approach involves parents in delinquency cases in a significantly different manner than prevailing
practice allows. This innovation concentrates on deterring and preventing juvenile delinquency, and
on appropriately involving parents with the process of reforming their child. Parental responsibility
laws that hold parents criminally liable essentially for the acts of their children should be repealed.
In their place, we should expand the delinquency jurisdiction of the family courts to make parents
parties to dispositional proceedings involving their children.
Conclusion
 For some years, we have witnessed a campaign against juvenile offenders and their parents, a
crusade in which both juvenile delinquency and poor parenting have been criminalized. Adolescents
have been declared adults by virtue of their anti-social acts and their parents have been infantilized
by the over-regulation in parental responsibility laws. At bottom, we have adopted a categorization
of juveniles as either mature and appropriately subject  [*107]  to the adult criminal justice system,
or as immature and the sole products of parental care. This bifurcation serves neither the needs of
society nor that of our youth.
This Article has argued against the notion that children who commit serious crimes have thereby
attained the cognitive, emotional, and moral maturity of adults, whose autonomous acts are properly
subject to the full force of the criminal law. The rationale for transferring some limited numbers of
violent youth to criminal court must be premised upon an analysis of the individual child's
rehabilitative potential and of the harm to society. This Article has equally disputed the premise of
the parental responsibility laws, that juvenile delinquency may normally be attributed to a failure of
parental supervision. The range and relative strength of influences upon adolescent development
precludes general reliance on any single-factor analysis. Parents undeniably have the primary
burden and responsibility to raise their children, and the expansion of the public welfare offense
category to include unlucky parenting violates core concerns of our criminal jurisprudence, not least
of which is the unfairness and unconstitutionality of applying strict criminal liability to judgment
calls involving the supervision of errant adolescents.
A more effective and logically consistent method to involve parents both in dealing with current
and in preventing future juvenile offenses must be found. Either of the two alternatives presented in
this Article would improve upon the coarse and derisory instrument of the criminal parental
responsibility laws. Parental participation in cases involving juvenile delinquency could be
increased through the use of family group conferences and other methods developed by the
therapeutic jurisprudence movement to reconnect offenders to their victims and the broader
community in a productive, restorative manner. Alternatively, parents could be made parties in the
dispositional phase of delinquency proceedings against their children. In this way, courts could
supervise the juvenile's rehabilitation as assisted by the parents, who would be integrally involved.
While neither of these proposals is perfect, either alternative better serves the needs of society as
well as of individual families than does the conversion of alleged poor parenting into a public
welfare offense.
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medical, dental, optometrical or surgical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial
or other reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or
allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive
corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug or drugs; or by misusing alcoholic beverages to the
extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature
requiring the aid of the court; provided, however, that where the respondent is voluntarily and
regularly participating in a rehabilitative program, evidence that the respondent has repeatedly
misused a drug or drugs or alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions
shall not establish that the child is a neglected child in the absence of evidence establishing that the
child's physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired as set forth in paragraph (i) of this subdivision; or
(ii) who has been abandoned ... by his parents or other person legally responsible for his care.
 Id. 1012(f).
"Impairment of emotional health" includes: a state of substantially diminished psychological or
intellectual functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive, control of
aggressive or self - destructive impulses, ability to think and reason, or acting out or misbehavior,
including incorrigibility, ungovernability or habitual truancy; provided, however, that such
impairment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to
exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.
 Id. 1012(h).
n440. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1012, at 320.
n441. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
n442. Matter of Katherine C., 122 Misc. 2d 276, 471 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984). Mere
speculation about the dangers to the children posed by the parents is insufficient. Matter of Bryan
L., 149 Misc. 2d 899, 565 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
n443. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1012.
n444. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1012, at 320. Concentrating on the
parents' behavior would increase the likelihood that state intervention "entail substituting a judge's
view of child rearing for that of the parents." Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1013-14 (1975).
n445. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1031.
n446. Id. 1011.
n447. See id. 1033-b.
n448. See In re Vulon Children, 56 Misc. 2d 19, 288 N.Y.S.2d 203 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1968). If the
court relies on the child protective investigation report in reaching its decision, the parents must
have "an opportunity to review [the report] or to offer evidence in rebuttal." In re Bercaw, 248
A.D.2d 881, 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
n449. In re Fisher, 79 Misc. 2d 905, 906, 361 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
n450. See In re Herbert F., 56 A.D.2d 601 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). A jury trial is not allowable,
however. See In re Walsh, 64 Misc. 2d 293, 315 N.Y.S.2d 59 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970).
n451. See, e.g., In re Robert Hanson, 51 A.D.2d 696, 379 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979); In re Darlene T., 271 N.E.2d 215 (N.Y. 1971).
n452. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1037. Under certain circumstances, the proceedings may proceed in the
parent's absence. Id. 1042.
n453. See id. 1038-a. The statute requires that the order authorizing the taking of such non-
testimonial evidence be preceded by a probable cause finding that the evidence is reasonably related
to establishing the abuse or neglect allegations, and that the taking be conducted "in a manner not
involving an unreasonable intrusion or risk of serious physical injury" to the parent. Id.
N454. See id. 1052.
n455. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1011, at 289.
n456. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1052(a). There are three other dispositional alternatives not mentioned
in the principal disposition statute. Id. 1052. The court may also grant an adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal. Id. 1039. A petition may also be dismissed because the court's "aid is
not required." Id. 1051(c). Finally, an abandoned child may be discharged to the Commission of
Social Services. Id. 1059.
n457. See id. 1054, 1056.
n458. See id. 1054, 1057.
n459. See id. 1072(a). For example, in In re George C., 122 A.D.2d 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986),
the court determined that release of the neglected child to the custody of his mother would only be
appropriate if she were closely supervised and ordered to attend an alcohol-related rehabilitative
program.
n460. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1072(a).
n461. Id.
n462. Id.
n463. See id. 1072(b).
n464. Id. 1011.
n465. In re Diane B., 96 Misc. 2d 798, 800, 409 N.Y.S.2d 648 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978).
n466. In re Maureen G., 103 Misc. 2d 109, 113, 426 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).
n467. Id. Child protective proceedings focus on children as members of a family, and on their
"protection from harm caused by persons whose responsibility for said children is based on some de
jure or de facto parental relationship with them." Id.
n468. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1072, at 328.
n469. See id. 1071-1072, at 325-28.
n470. Id.
n471. See id. 1072, at 328.
n472. Id. Quiescence is also suggested by the paucity of reported decisions interpreting section
1072(b), the section allowing for the imposition of a jail term. In the three decades since the
section's enactment in 1970, only three reported cases have involved jail sentences imposed on
parents. Two of these cases involved thirty day sentences. Duquette v. Ducatte, 102 A.D.2d 904,
477 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Matter of Felicia R., 92 A.D.2d 743, 461 N.Y.S.2d 85
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983). The third involved unusual circumstances showing a particular depravity. A
father committed a sex offense against his daughter, for which he was convicted in criminal court
and sentenced to the state penitentiary. He was also served with a family court order of protection
demanding that he initiate no further contact with his daughter. He violated that order from prison,
causing great emotional distress to the child. Under these circumstances, the family court sentenced
the father to six months in jail, to be served after the conclusion of his state incarceration. Ulster
County Dep't of Soc. Services v. Clarence A., 152 Misc. 2d 945, 578 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1991). A
veteran family court attorney informed the author that in twelve years of a very active practice in
New York City's family courts, she did not encounter one case involving the jailing of a parent
under this section.
n473. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1012; Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1012, at
326 (there is a "minimum baseline of proper care for children that all parents, regardless of lifestyle
or social or economic position, must meet").
n474. A child protective proceeding may also focus on a child who evidences "substantially
diminished psychological or intellectual functioning in relations to ... control of aggressive or self-
destructive impulses ... or acting out or misbehavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability or
habitual truancy." N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1012(h). This jurisdictional lever may not easily be used to
convert the proceeding into one centered on parenting, however. In addition to the general non-
punitive orientation of the family court act, the child's impairment as described in this section must
"be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the [parent] to exercise a minimum
degree of care toward the child." Id. Invoking the court's jurisdiction on this basis would thus
require clear proof of "the causal relationship between the parent's action or inaction and the child's
emotional condition." Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1012, at 377.
n475. PINS (Persons in Need of Supervision) proceedings provide yet another possible
jurisdictional hook for rendering parents parties to their children's family court cases. See, e.g., N.Y.
Fam. Ct. Act art. 7. The vast majority of PINS petitions are brought by the children's parents or
other caretakers, alleging that the children are habitual truants or "incorrigible, ungovernable or
habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority." Id. 712(a).
Although victims and witnesses of a child's acts which arguably warrant PINS intervention are
authorized to bring a petition, id. 733(c), they rarely do so. Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra
note 437, 733, at 68. PINS proceedings are inappropriate for extending jurisdiction over the parents,
because the anti-social conduct at issue in these matters involves "noncriminal, status offenses."
Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, art. 7, at 3. Most status offenses are not even
formally processed through the court. Up to 80% of all such cases are diverted to community
service programs or handled in other fora without the filing of a petition. See Carol S. Stevenson et
al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and Recommendations, in 6 Ctr. for the Future of Children, The
Future of Children 4, 13 (1996). The court's delinquency jurisdiction also reaches a far greater
audience, as delinquency represents almost two-thirds of the juvenile court docket, while status
offenses account for only 15 percent. H. Ted Rubin, The Nature of the Court Today, in 6 The Future
of Children 40, 44 (1996). Finally, PINS jurisdiction is designed to "benefit a person in need of
supervision, not to protect the general public from him." Certo v. State, 53 A.D.2d 971, 385
N.Y.S.2d 824 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); see also In re R., 67 Misc. 2d 452, 323 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1971) (citing the overall purpose to rehabilitate children and make services available to
them, "not to vindicate private wrongs").
n476. Traditionally, the only parties to a delinquency proceeding were the state and the child,
and so the court lacked jurisdiction over the parents. See, e.g., N.Y. Laws 1905 ch. 655 (stating that
there is no role for parents in juvenile delinquency law except in contributing to the delinquency of
a minor proceedings). The proposal in the text contemplates the parents becoming parties only at
the dispositional stage of the delinquency. It would be inappropriate for the parents to become
parties at the fact-finding hearing, since this stage is comparable to the trial phase of an adult
criminal proceeding, with the state bearing the burden of proving the allegations in the delinquency
petition beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 342.2 (outlining the guidelines for
"evidence in fact-finding hearings").
n477. See, e.g., Chapin, supra note 200, at 658-59 (citing evidence that California's 1988
amendment to its contributing-to-delinquency law was aimed at forcing parents of gang members
into parenting classes, rather than at obtaining criminal convictions against the parents); Zolman,
supra note 153, at 219 (arguing that the "rationale behind ... these laws [is] the deterrence of
delinquency and help for struggling parents," as opposed to the punitive purposes that many see as
the impetus for these laws).
n478. Or. Rev. Stat. 163.577 (1999).
n479. See id. 163.577(6)(b).
n480. Id. 163.577(6)(a).
n481. Id. 163.577(7)(a). Upon satisfactory completion of the parent effectiveness program, the
court may discharge the parent. Id. But if the parent fails to so complete the program, the court may
impose a sentence authorized by this section. Id. A sentence under this subsection may be
suspended only once. See id. 163.577(7)(b). The maximum sanction for violation of the statute is a
fine of up to $ 1,000, the maximum fine for a class A violation. See id. 163.577(9).
n482. St. Clair Shore Ordinances 20-560.
n483. See id. 20-565.
n484. See id. 20-565(c).
n485. See id. 20-565(d).
n486. Id.
n487. See id. 20-565(e).
n488. See Catherine J. Ross, The Failure of Fragmentation: The Promise of a System of Unified
Family Courts, 32 Fam. L.Q. 3 (1998) (advocating the holistic approach of unified family courts as
a substantial improvement over scattered proceedings in family and criminal cases); see generally
Symposium, Unified Family Courts, 32 Fam. L.Q. 1, 1-199 (1998).
n489. Although it would involve more logistical problems than the proposal articulated in the
text, it may also be justifiable to craft a similar scheme in some cases involving transfer of the
juvenile to adult court.
n490. Rubin, supra note 475, at 48.
n491. See text at notes 176-215, supra.
n492. States clearly have the constitutional authority to impose duties upon parents related to the
care of their children. Courts have long upheld the constitutionally of contributing-to-delinquency
statutes "on the broad policy ground that the welfare of youth is such a vital state interest that the
legislature must write statutes in general terms that preserve the flexibility necessary to handle the
problem of juvenile delinquency effectively." Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations
on State Power to Hold Parents Criminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44
Vand. L. Rev. 441, 452 (1991); see also State v. Cialkowski, 227 N.W.2d 406 (Neb. 1975); State v.
Harris, 141 S.E. 637 (W. Va. 1928); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. Ct. App.
1960); People v. Deibert, 256 P.2d 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). The proposed assertion of jurisdiction
over parents in the dispositional phases of delinquency cases is analogous to the long-standing
constitutional authority of states to impose civil liability upon parents for their children's tortious
acts. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Caffiero, 431 A.2d 799, 807 (N.J. 1981) (upholding civil statute).
n493. See, e.g., Besharov, Practice Commentaries, supra note 437, 1011, at 289; N.Y. Fam. Ct.
Act art. 10 (McKinney 1999) (discussing the child abuse and neglect jurisdiction of the family court
over parents).
n494. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act art. 10.
n495. See, e.g., Garbarino, supra note 425.
n496. The line drawn in the text is admittedly a fine one. It may sometimes be difficult to
distinguish between, on the one hand, a treatment program aimed at the child and requiring the
parent's involvement, and on the other, a similar program aimed at the parent in an effort to improve
the parent's behavior and thus benefit the child. However, the principled difference to bear in mind
is that the first option legitimately asserts state power over delinquency respondents, triggered by
their misconduct, and calls upon the parents to further their traditional role as caretakers. The
second option, however, arrogates judicial power to amend parents' behavior in a case in which
those parents have not been convicted of any act authorizing state intervention.
n497. Or. Rev. Stat. 419C.570(1)(a) (1999). The parents may be made parties to the
dispositional stage of the proceedings, not to the adjudicatory stage. See id. 429C.285.
n498. See id. 419C.570(1)(a)(A).
n499. Similar statutes in other states are not as comprehensive. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. 31-37-
15-1 (Michie 1997); N.M. Stat. Ann. 32A-2-28 (Michie Supp. 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. 19-2-113
(2000). Thus, the Oregon statute provides a better window into the analysis of the benefits and
weaknesses of this new approach.
n500. Or. Rev. Stat. 419C.570(1)(a)(C), 419C.570(1)(b).
n501. See id. 419C.570(1)(b).
n502. Id. The parents may also be assessed all or part of the cost of a mental health assessment
or screening of their child. Id. 419C.570(1)(a)(B).
n503. Id. 419C.575.
n504. See text at notes 176-215, supra.
n505. To reiterate, this Article argues that a finding that a parent's conduct has endangered the
child's welfare may be appropriate in a criminal case or in a child abuse or neglect proceeding, but
not in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Child protective proceedings in family court focus on
harm to the child by the parent (as opposed to harm to a third party by the child), and, in that
context, provide for consideration of the impact of a parent's abuse of drugs or alcohol on the
welfare of the child. See, e.g., N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act 1012(f)(i)(B), 1046(a)(iii) (McKinney 1999).
n506. Or. Rev. Stat. 419C.575.
n507. Id. Given the variety of strategies for and possible outcomes of the hearing, such a
decision by the court may place the parent's interests in opposition to the child's interests as well as
to those of the state.
n508. Id.
n509. See id. 419C.575, 135.050.
n510. See id. 419C.575. "The judge shall state with particularity, both orally and in the written
order of the disposition, the precise terms of the disposition." Id.
n511. Id.
n512. Id. 419C.573(1)(a)(A).
n513. See id. 419C.573(1)(a)(B).
n514. See id. 419C.570(2), 419C.573(2). The penalty paragraph contained in section
419C.573(2) describes payment of the sum as "an alternative to a contempt proceeding." Id. The
statute does not label the sum which is to be paid as either a fine or court cost, nor does it indicate
whether the parent so ordered is entitled to a show cause hearing or to any other procedural rights
prior to the issuance of the violation judgment.
n515. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Now, Parents on Trial, Newsweek, Oct. 2, 1989, at 54
("Most parents of the 1.6 million minors arrested last year are too poor to pay the fines.") (quoting
Howard Snyder, a director of the National Center for Juvenile Justice).
n516. For example, an Ohio statute requires a parent whose child has been adjudicated
delinquent to enter into a recognizance with sufficient surety in the amount of not more than $ 500,
conditioned on the faithful discharge of the child's probation conditions. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
2151.411(B) (Anderson Supp. 2000). If the child violates the terms of probation or is adjudicated
delinquent based on a second incident, the court will conduct a hearing to determine if the failure
"to subject the child to reasonable parental control" or "faithfully to discharge the conditions of
probation of the child on the part of that parent" is "the proximate cause of the act or acts of the
child upon which the second delinquent child adjudication is based or upon which the child is found
to have violated the conditions of the child's probation." Id. If the court so finds, it may declare all
or a part of the recognizance forfeited. Id.; see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-6-244 (Michie 2001)
(requiring parent who has failed or neglected to reasonably control juvenile, and whose conduct is
the proximate cause of the crimes the child committed, to post bond in amount up to $ 500 when
child adjudicated delinquent is placed on probation; parent forfeits bond if the juvenile commits a
subsequent delinquent act or is found to be in contempt of court or to have violated the terms of his
probation, and the court, after a hearing, finds that the child's act was proximately caused by the
failure or neglect of the parent or guardian to subject the juvenile to reasonable parental control).
n517. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code 2151.411(C)(1) (authorizing contempt sanction for willful
failure of parent to comply with order in delinquency case); N.M. Stat. Ann. 32A-2-28(C) (Michie
Supp. 1999) (same); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 8-247, 8-308(B) (West Supp. 2000) (same); Colo. Rev.
Stat. 19-2-113(1)(a) (2000) (same).
n518. Cf. Mark H. Moore, The Future of the Juvenile Court: A Theoretical Framework That
Fits, in 6 Ctr. for the Future of Children, The Future of Children 140, 142-45 (1996) (discussing
jurisprudential principles for a "family bankruptcy court").
